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WHEN BALANCE AND FAIRNESS COLLIDE: AN ARGUMENT
FOR EXECUTION IMPACT EVIDENCE IN CAPITAL TRIALS
Wayne A. Logan*
A central precept of death penalty jurisprudence is that only the "death worthy"
should be condemned, based on a "reasoned moral response" by the sentencing
authority. Over the past decade, however, the Supreme Court has distanced itself
from its painstaking efforts in the 1970s to calibrate death decision making in the
name offairness. Compelling proof of this shift is manifest in the Court's decisions
to permit victim impact evidence in capital trials, and to allow jurors to be in-
structed that sympathy for capital defendants is not to influence capital decisions.
This Article examines a novel strategy now being employed by capital defendants
in response: the proffer of "execution impact evidence, " intended to inform the sen-
tencer of the manifold consequences of the defendant's possible execution. Professor
Logan advances several arguments in favor of its admission, based most promi-
nently on a defendant's constitutional right to have consideration given to
mitigating evidence, and the need for such evidence to restore a semblance of the
even-handedness historically sought in capital trials.
"When a man is hung, there is an end of our relations with
him. His execution is a way of saying, 'You are not fit for this
world, take your chance elsewhere.""
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's capital punishment jurisprudence is not
only complex but also beset with manifold contradictions. Central
among these are the conflicting constitutional mandates that death
decisions be "individualized" on the basis of the "character and
record of the individual offender,"2 yet not so individualized as to
* Assistant Professor, State University of New York at Albany, School of Criminal Jus-
tice. B.A. 1983, Wesleyan University; M.A. 1986, State University of New York at Albany; J.D.
1991, University of Wisconsin Law School. I thank Professors James Acker, David Logan,
Scott Sundby, Margaret Vandiver, and Ron Wright for their thoughtful comments and sug-
gestions in the preparation of this Article.
1. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 290 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (citations
omitted).
2. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976); see also Lockett v. Ohio, 438
U.S. 586, 605 (1978) (emphasizing "[t]he need for treating each defendant in a capital case
with that degree of respect due the uniqueness of the individual").
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be "wantonly" and "freakishly imposed."3 To complicate matters
further, the Court has expanded its notion of individualization. No
longer is individualization oriented principally toward capital
defendants, intended to provide capital jurors an informed basis to
exercise mercy.4 Increasingly, individualization is invoked by the
State to more readily convince jurors of the "deathworthiness" of
those found guilty of capital murder.'
This shift has been most apparent in the opinions of the
Rehnquist Court, which has forcefully embraced the notion that
individualization cuts both ways. The foremost example of the
Chief Justice's imprint is his majority opinion in Payne v. Tennessee,6
the Court's controversial 1991 decision to allow "victim impact"
testimony in capital trials. Embracing the premise that the sentenc-
ing phase was "unfairly weighted" in favor of capital defendants, by
virtue of their unfettered right to proffer relevant mitigating evi-
dence,7 ChiefJustice Rehnquist asserted that the State must be free
to establish (1) the "uniqueness" of the victim and (2) the harm
caused to surviving loved ones by the murder, as indicated by tes-
timony from those left behind.8 This evidence, the Chief Justice
stated, is needed to "'keep the balance true"' between the con-
3. Furman, 408 U.S. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring); see also Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455
U.S. 104, 112 (1982) (stating that the death penalty must be imposed "fairly, and with rea-
sonable consistency, or not at all").
4. See, e.g., Eddings, 455 U.S. at 112; Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604-05; Woodson, 428 U.S. at
304.
5. See, e.g., Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1, 10 (1994) (upholding admission of evi-
dence of death judgment from previous murder trial in later, unrelated murder trial of
defendant); Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 904-06 (1983) (upholding admission of specu-
lative psychiatric testimony regarding "future dangerousness," likening it to "other relevant
evidence against any defendant in a criminal case"); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 878-80
(1983) (permitting jurors' consideration of non-statutory aggravating evidence). As the Zant
Court noted:
[T]he Constitution does not require the jury to ignore other possible aggravating fac-
tors in the process of selecting, from among that class, those defendants who will
actually be sentenced to death. What is important at the selection stage is an indi-
vidualized determination on the basis of the character of the individual and the
circumstances of the crime.
Id. at 878-79 (citations and footnote omitted).
6. 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
7. See id. at 822.
8. See id. at 823, 826-27; see also id. at 833 (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that "[t] he
Court correctly observes the injustice of requiring the exclusion of relevant aggravating
evidence during capital sentencing, while requiring the admission of all relevant mitigating
evidence").
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demned capital defendant and the State,9 and to ensure that the
State can avail itself of the "full moral force of its evidence." 10
While the Payne Court's presumption that "balance" between the
accused and the State is constitutionally required is itself subject to
serious question," the Court's approval of victim impact evidence is
entirely consistent with its hastening of what one commentator has
accurately described as the "disappearing capital defendant.' 2 At
the same time, the Court has placed limits on how jurors can re-
spond to the positive, constitutionally-required mitigation evidence
presented by the defense. Indeed, on the basis of the Court's deci-
sions in California v. Brown13 and Saffle v. Parks,14 jurors can be
instructed that "sympathy" for convicted defendants is not to drive
their death decisions.
The upshot of this evolution, in which the politically empowered
victims' rights movement has played a crucial role, 5 is a system
9. Id. at 827 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 122 (1934)).
10. Id. at 825.
11. See Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 480 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring) (noting
that "[m ] uch of the Bill of Rights is designed to redress the advantage that inheres in a gov-
ernment prosecution"); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 111-12 (1970) (Black, J.,
concurring and dissenting) (noting that "[t]he Framers were well aware of the awesome
investigative and prosecutorial powers of government and it was in order to limit those pow-
ers that they spelled out in detail in the Constitution the procedure to be followed in
criminal trials"). AsJustice Stevens correctly noted in his Payne dissent, "[t]he premise that a
criminal prosecution requires an even-handed balance between the State and the defendant
is ... incorrect. The Constitution grants certain rights to the criminal defendant and im-
poses special limitations on the State designed to protect the individual from overreaching
by the disproportionately powerful State." Payne, 501 U.S. at 860 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see
also Susan Bandes, Taking Some Rights Too Seriously: The State's Right to a Fair Trial, 60 S. CAL.
L. RaV. 1019, 1022-23 (1987) (noting that "[t]he Constitution makes no mention of the
State's right to a fair or impartial trial"). See generally DAVID J. BODENHAMER, FAIR TRIAL:
RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1992) (describing constitutional deference
to criminal defendants).
12. Joan W. Howarth, Deciding to Kill: Revealing the Gender in the Task Handed to Capital
Jurors, 1994 Wis. L. REv. 1345, 1382.
13. 479 U.S. 538, 542 (1987).
14. 494 U.S. 484, 490 (1990).
15. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 834 (Scalia, J., concurring) (asserting that the pre-existing
prohibition of victim impact evidence "conflict[ed] with a public sense of justice keen
enough that it has found voice in a nationwide 'victims' rights' movement"). See generally
Peggy M. Tobolowsky, Victim Participation in the Criminal Justice Process: Fifteen Years After the
President's Task Force on Victims of Crime, 25 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 21
(1999) (surveying widespread increases in victim participation in all aspects of prosecutions,
including sentencing).
The explicit idea that "balance" is called for between victims (as opposed to the State)
and criminal defendants permeates the nationwide proliferation of victims' rights provi-
sions. See, e.g., OHIO CONST. art I, § 10(a) (1994 Editor's Comment) (noting that proponents
of the Ohio victims' rights constitutional amendment argued that the amendment was a
"question of balance" because there was no "corresponding" victim-oriented provision in the
Ohio Constitution); S.C. CONST. art. I, § 24(A) (identifying originating purpose of 'Victims'
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increasingly shorn of procedural barriers designed to insulate
capital jurors from the arbitrary influences that produced the
"wanton" and "capricious" outcomes condemned by the Supreme
Court in 1972 in Furman v. Georgia.'6 As one commentator recently
observed, the Supreme Court "has transformed the capital
sentencing hearing into a rematch between the offender and her
victim.... [T]he jury now chooses between two contestants: the
defendant and the victim, locked once again in mortal combat.
1 7
In condoning this pitched battle, the Court has created a seriously
imbalanced playing field, at once permitting de-individualization
of capital defendants' s and the hyper-individualization of their
victims.' 9 In this new environment, capital defendants have
Bill of Rights" as the need to "preserve and protect victims' rights to justice and due proc-
ess").
This perceived "imbalance" is also a central concern of advocates of the proposed federal
victims' rights constitutional amendment, who contend that the victims' rights provisions in
place nationwide, and in the constitutions of at least 29 states, are inadequate because the
rights they embody are "subservient" to the defendants' established federal constitutional
rights. See, e.g., Proposal for a Constitutional Amendment to Provide Rights for Victims of Crime:
Hearings on H.J. Res. 173 and H.. Res. 174 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciay, 104th Cong.
169 (1996) (statement of John R. Schmidt, Associate Attorney General, Department of Jus-
tice) (stating that the Clinton administration's support for amendment was not premised on
view "that a victim's rights be given more weight than the rights of an accused ... [but] to
make sure they are given equal weight"); Richard Barajas & Scott Alexander Nelson, The
Proposed Crime Victims' Federal Constitutional Amendment: Working Toward a Proper Balance, 49
BAYLOR L. REv. 1, 14 (1997) (identifying the "need for balance between the rights of the
victim and the rights of the accused"). Critics of the proposed amendment express alarm
over precisely this perceived need to rectify the Constitution. See, e.g., Robert P. Mosteller,
Essay, Victims' Rights and the United States Constitution: An Effort to Recast the Battle in Criminal
Litigation, 85 GEO. L.J. 1691, 1692 (1998) (arguing that "the Amendment will help change
the outcomes of criminal litigation in favor of the victim in a 'zero sum game' against the
accused").
16. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
17. Markus Dirk Dubber, Regulating the Tender Heart When the Axe Is Ready to Strike, 41
ButT. L. REv. 85, 86-87 (1993) [hereinafter Dubber, Tender Heart]; see also Angela P. Harris,
The Jurisprudence of Victimhood, 1991 SuP. CT. REv. 77, 78 (describing the Court's view of
capital cases as being a contest between defendant and victim).
Nor is the battle always concluded at the moment of sentencing. In Texas, for instance,
crime victims and survivors are permitted-after formal sentence has been pronounced-to
provide yet another public account of the effect of the crime on their lives. See generally Keith
D. Nicholson, Comment, Would You Like More Salt with That Wound? Post-Sentence Victim Allo-
cution in Texas, 26 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1103 (1995) (discussing TEX. CRIM. P. CODE ANN. art.
42.03, § 1 (b) (West 1995)). Texas, along with several other states, also permits victims' fami-
lies to attend and bear witness to the actual execution of the condemned murderer. See
Michael Lawrence Goodwin, Note, An Eyefulfor an Eye: An Argument Against Allowing the Fami-
lies of Murder Victims to View Executions, 36 BRANDEIS J. FAM. L. 585 (1998) (discussing "right-
to-view" statutes, policies, and procedures nationwide).
18. See Dubber, Tender Heart, supra note 17, at 87 (arguing that Payne, Parks, and Brown
"deindividualized the capital defendant and individualized her victim").
19. See infra notes 93-160 and accompanying text (discussing widespread admission of
highly prejudicial victim impact evidence without procedural controls or limits on its use).
[VOL. 33:1&2
Wen Balance and Fairness Collide
struggled to restore some of the even-handedness and fairness that
our constitutional traditions demand. One defense strategy in
particular will be examined here: the use of "execution impact
evidence," which informs capital jurors of the effect that a
defendant's execution will have on his or her surviving loved ones.
The Article begins with an overview of the historic mission of
capital juries: to render a "reasoned moral response," based on the
defendant's character, background, and crime. Part II discusses the
Court's decisions in Payne, Brown, and Parks, and surveys the wide-
spread use of victim impact evidence in capital trials. Courts
nationwide now regularly permit far more than a mere "'glimpse
of the life"' that a defendant "extinguish [ed], "2° as envisioned by
Payne, and provide jurors scant guidance in how to employ the
emotional, virtually unrebuttable evidence in death decisions. Part
III examines the largely unsuccessful efforts of defendants to get
execution impact evidence before capital juries, and the rationales
offered by appellate courts to justify barring its admission. Finally,
in Part IV, the Article advances several arguments in favor of the
admission of execution impact evidence, based most prominently
on the constitutional right of capital defendants to proffer and
have sentencing consideration given to relevant mitigating evi-
dence, and the recognition that execution impact evidence, in the
midst of the emotional tug-of-war created by Payne, is needed to
restore a semblance of the procedural even-handedness historically
sought in capital proceedings.
I. THE DEATH PENALTY: A "REASONED MORAL RESPONSE"
For over twenty-five years, starting with the landmark Furman v.
Georgia, the Supreme Court has wrestled with virtually every aspect
of the capital sanction and how it is imposed. Although the case
law has proven notoriously complex, one unifying theme has
emerged: the death penalty, which differs in harshness from all
other sanctions, should be reserved for only the most blamewor-
thy." In order to facilitate this sorting, the Court has mandated
20. Payne, 501 U.S. at 822 (citing Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 397, 397 (1988)
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)). See, e.g., State v. Knese, 985 S.W.2d 759, 771 (Mo. 1999)
(asserting that "to suggest ... that Payne stands for the proposition that only a brief glimpse
of the victim's life is constitutionally permissible is to misread that case."), cert. denied, 526
U.S. 1136 (1999).
21. See Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 468 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting and con-
curring in part) ("[T]he death penalty is qualitatively different from any other punishment,
FALL 1999-WINTER 2000]
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that death penalty jurisdictions employ a bifurcated proceeding.
After first determining that a particular defendant committed a
capital crime, the sentencing authority (typically the jury) must
decide whether the defendant merits the ultimate sanction, death,
on the basis of facts and factors that are largely independent of
those considered at the guilt phase.22 In so doing, the jury renders
a "reasoned moral response" 23 to the crime and the defendant, in
effect culling from the living those unfit to live.24 As Third Circuit
Court of Appeals Judge Richard Nygaard put it even more bluntly:
and hence must be accompanied by unique safeguards to ensure that it is a justified re-
sponse to a given offense."); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) ("The need for
treating each defendant in a capital case with that degree of respect due the uniqueness of
the individual is far more important than in noncapital cases."); see also Phyllis L. Crocker,
Concepts of Culpability and Deathworthiness: Differentiating Between Guilt and Punishment in Death
Penalty Cases, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 21, 22 (1997) ("The punishment of death is supposed to
be reserved for those defendants who commit the most grievous murders and deserve the
most extreme punishment.").
22. See Crocker, supra note 21, at 26 (recognizing that "[t] he punishment-phase determi-
nation is not a recapitulation of the guilt-phase decision, but both a reconceptualization of
the defendant's guilt-phase culpability and the consideration of new factors relevant only to
punishment"). Professor Crocker adds:
[T] he question of what punishment should be imposed on the defendant... is more
than a statement about his culpability for committing the crime; it is a judgment
about his character, his record, his background, the circumstances and character of
the murder, and the harm caused, not only to the victim, but to the victim's family.
None of these features are relevant to the guilt-phase determination of culpability;
they are all essential to the punishment decision about the defendant's deathworthi-
ness.
Id. at 82-83; see also Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 163 (1994) (noting that mat-
ters that are irrelevant at the guilt stage "step into the foreground and require consideration
at the sentencing phase"); California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1007 (1983) (stating that there
is a "fundamental difference between the nature of the guilt/innocence determination ...
and the nature of the life/death choice at the penalty phase"); Bullington v. Missouri, 451
U.S. 430, 450 (1981) (Powell,J., dissenting) ("Underlying the question of guilt or innocence
is an objective truth: the defendant, in fact, did or did not commit the acts constituting the
crime charged.... The sentencer's function is not to discover a fact, but to mete out just
deserts as he sees them."); GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 491 (1978)
("[G] uilt, culpability and blameworthiness ... do not raise questions of the actor's general
moral worth or even of his moral wickedness.... They pinpoint the specific inquiry into
whether it is fair to hold the actor accountable for an act of legal wrongdoing.").
23. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989) (quoting California v. Brown, 479 U.S.
538, 545 (1987)) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis omitted).
24. See, e.g., Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 340 n.7 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., con-
curring) (explaining that the jury is called upon to make a "highly subjective, 'unique,
individualized judgment regarding the punishment that a particular person deserves'"
(quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 900 (1983)); Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 469 (Stevens, J.,
concurring and dissenting in part) (stating that the decision to impose death is an
"expression of the community's outrage-its sense that an individual has lost his moral enti-
tlement to live").
[VOL. 33:1&2
Fhen Balance and Fairness Collide
"to kill, the state must be prepared to evaluate a human life, place
it at zero, and take it.
2 5
Since Woodson v. North Carolina, which struck down the ground-
swell of mandatory death penalty schemes arising in the wake of
Furman, the Supreme Court has made clear that this process of
identification must be based on an "individualized" sentencing de-
termination. According to the Woodson Court, such individu-
alization is compelled by "evolving standards of decency" and the
ideal of human dignity, both inhering in the Eighth Amendment.
27
Two years later, in Lockett v. Ohio,2 s the Court solidified the consti-
tutional status of this requirement: the sentencing authority cannot
"be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of
the defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances
of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence
less than death., 29 According to Lockett, "[w]hen the choice is be-
tween life and death, that risk [that death will be imposed despite
evidence calling for a less severe penalty] is unacceptable and in-
compatible with the commands of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments."
0
0
Although Lockett's individualization mandate has come under
fire for its apparent tension with Furman's concern over
"unfettered" decision making,31 the constitutional preference in
25. Richard Lowell Nygaard, Crime, Pain, and Punishment: A Skeptic's View, 102 DICK. L.
REv. 355, 370 (1998).
26. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
27. See id. at 304 ("[T]he fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth
Amendment ... requires consideration of the character and record of the individual of-
fender ... .") (citation omitted). Woodson's focus on individualization had its origins in the
Court's prior decisions of similar emphasis. See, e.g., Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247
(1949); Pennsylvania ex rel. Sullivan v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51, 55 (1937). These cases themselves
emanate from the early twentieth century effort to humanize and make more effective the
criminal justice process. See, e.g., Sheldon Glueck, Principles of a Rational Penal Code, 41 HARV.
L. REv. 453, 481 (1928) (advocating a "scientific individualization of peno-correctional di-
agnosis and treatment"); Sam B. Warner & Henry B. Cabot, Changes in the Administration of
Criminal Justice During the Past Fifty Years, 50 HARV. L. REv. 583, 600-01 (1937) (referencing
the "scientific" effort to categorize and process offenders).
28. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
29. Id. at 604 (plurality opinion).
30. Id. at 605.
31. Justice Antonin Scalia has been individualization's harshest critic. See Buchanan v.
Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 279 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("I continue to adhere to my
view that the Eighth Amendment does not.., require that sentencing juries be given discre-
tion to consider mitigating evidence ... ."); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 664 (1990)
(Scalia, J., concurring) ("To acknowledge that 'there perhaps is an inherent tension' be-
tween [the Lockett line of cases] and the line stemming from Furman ... is rather like saying
that there was perhaps an inherent tension between the Allies and the Axis Powers in World
War II."). For a sample of the many convincing rebuttals of Justice Scalia's position see, e.g.,
FALL 1999-WINTER 2000]
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favor of providing jurors the broadest possible access to potentially
mitigating evidence in their "deathworthiness" decisions is beyond
dispute.32 In its 1998 Term, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated for the
Court that in the capital selection phase:
[W]e have emphasized the need for a broad inquiry into all
relevant mitigating evidence to allow an individualized deter-
mination. .. . [O]ur cases have established that the sentencer
may not be precluded from considering, and may not refuse
to consider, any constitutionally relevant mitigating evidence.
... Our consistent concern has been that restrictions on the
jury's sentencing determination not preclude the jury from
being able to give effect to mitigating evidence.33
Indeed, the Court has reasoned that the focus on "deserts" im-
plicit in the individualization mandate is integral to the
predominant, retributive-based justification of the death penalty
itself.34 As noted by one commentator, "It]he individualization
mandate finds justification, if at all, in the need to avoid retributive
excess in the use of the death penalty. The mandate must serve as
assurance that only those who actually deserve the death penalty
receive it. ' 5 In short, the death penalty derives whatever moral and
Dubber, Tender Heart, supra note 17, at 103; Stephen P. Garvey, "As the Gentle Rain from
Heaven". Mercy in Capital Sentencing, 81 CORNELL L. REv. 989, 1002-05 (1996).
32. This was perhaps best expressed by Justice Lewis Powell, who observed that "a con-
sistency produced by ignoring individual differences is a false consistency." Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982); see also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989)
(stating that the capital defendant must be treated as a "unique individual human being");
Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 869 (1982) (stating that imposition of the death penalty
must turn on a "individualized determination... [based on] the character of the individual
and the circumstances of the crime").
33. Buchanan, 522 U.S. at 276.
34. See, e.g., McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 443 (1990) ("[I]t is precisely be-
cause the punishment should be directly related to the personal culpability of the defendant
that the jury must be allowed to consider and give effect to mitigating evidence relevant to a
defendant's character or record or the circumstances of the offense."). See generally Dubber,
Tender Heart, supra note 17, at 132 ("Over the course of capital jurisprudence since Furman,
the Court has settled on a generally retributive approach to capital sentencing."); Scott W.
Howe, Reassessing the Individualization Mandate in Capital Sentencing: Darrow's Defense of Leopold
and Loeb, 79 IOWA L. Rev. 989, 1069 (1994) ("[T]he Eighth Amendment function of the
sentencing inquiry could only be to provide for desert assessments to help avoid imposition
of the death penalty when it would constitute retributive excess-when it would be unde-
served."); Margaret J. Radin, Cruel Punishment and Respect for Persons: Super Due Process for
Death, 53 S. CAL. L. REv. 1143, 1159 (1980) ("The substantive judgment to be made is a
moraljudgment: Does this person deserve death as punishment?").
35. Howe, supra note 34, at 1051-52; see also Eddmonds v. Peters, 93 F.3d 1307, 1312
(7th Cir. 1996) (noting the purpose of mitigating evidence is to show that defendant is "not
as 'bad'" as the guilty verdict indicates).
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constitutional authority it enjoys 6 from the self-limiting influence
of the individualization mandate. 7
In keeping with Lockett's demand for individualization, the
Court has repeatedly insisted that states permit unconstrained
consideration of "all relevant mitigating evidence" proffered by
the defense. 38 Perhaps because it has desired to remain morally
neutral on the matter of when a sentence of less than death is
deserved, the Court itself has not seen fit to define in any mean-
ingful way the proper scope of mitigating evidence. 9 Instead, it
has stuck by its broadly inclusive definition, first enunciated in
Lockett, that encompasses evidence relating to "any aspect of a
defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of
the offense,"40 and developed its jurisprudence on a pragmatic,
case-by-case basis.41
36. Professors Carol and Jordan Steiker point out that the individualization mandate is
also grounded in the Eighth Amendment requirement that "like cases must be treated alike
in order to enhance the 'reliability' of the imposition of the death penalty." Carol S. Steiker
&Jordan M. Steiker, Let God Sort Them Out? Refining the Individualization Requirement in Capital
Sentencing, 102 YALE L.J. 835, 870 n.50 (1992) [hereinafter Steiker & Steiker, Let God Sort
Them Out?]; see also id. at 843 ("[T] he individualization requirement makes constitutionally
relevant any and all traits or experiences that distinguish one individual from another.").
They also offer an alternate Eighth Amendment justification, namely, "the right of both the
defendant and the sentencer to have the humanity of the defendant squarely confronted in
the capital sentencing process." Id. at 845 n.50. Such information permits the sentencer
to appreciate the humanity of the defendant and to recognize thereby the gravity of
the decision to impose the death penalty in a particular case. Confronted with details
about an individual defendant a sentencer may be moved-in an inarticulable and
nonstandardized way-to impose a sentence less than death.
Id.; see also Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 387 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("The
insistence in our law that the sentencer know and consider the defendant as a human being
before deciding whether to impose the ultimate sanction operates as a shield against arbi-
trary execution.... .").
37. Perhaps the best support for this argument is found in the pre-Woodson era of
mandatory death sentences, when juries frequently nullified capital law when faced with
defendants deemed unworthy of death. See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 290-91 (discussing same).
38. See, e.g., Buchanan, 522 U.S. at 276 ("Our consistent concern has been that restric-
tions on the jury's sentencing determination not preclude the jury from being able to give
effect to mitigating evidence.").
39. See, e.g., James R. Acker & Charles S. Lanier, In Fairness and Mercy: Statutory Mitigat-
ing Factors in Capital Punishment Laws, 30 CRIM. L. BULL. 299, 303 (1994) (stating that the
Court's definition of "the boundaries of mitigating evidence in the context of capital sen-
tencing is conspicuous for its lack of substance"); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober
Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109
HARV. L. REV. 355, 389 (1995) [hereinafter Steiker & Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts] (stating
that the Court's opinions "did not specify what kinds of evidence could be regarded as
'mitigating' 
").
40. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604.
41. See Steiker & Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts, supra note 39, at 398 (characterizing the
Court's death penalty jurisprudence as less "a systematic effort to regulate the death penalty
University of Mihigan Journal of Law Reform [
This inclusiveness notwithstanding, mitigation evidence comes
in three basic categories. The first category, pertaining to offender
culpability and responsibility, encompasses information concern-
ing defendant's background, history, and role in the predicate
crime. 42 Evidence relating to an offender's youth,43 history of emo-
tional or physical abuse,44 or relative lack of involvement in the
predicate murder 45 falls into this category. The second category
involves considerations of future dangerousness. Although not
mitigating in a strict sense, an offender's capacity to be rehabili-
tated, or otherwise act peacefully in prison, merits admission
pursuant to Lockett's requirement that evidence possibly warranting
a "sentence less than death" be available to the sentencing author-
ity.
46
The third category of mitigation evidence, that of most interest
here, concerns the offender's "character" or general "deserts."47
Although the Court has yet to define "character" in mitigation,48 it
plays a crucial role insofar as it provides insight into the
defendant's essential social or "moral worth," the lynchpin of the
capital sentencing decision. Indeed, the Court has signaled its
process so much as a series of responses to particular circumstances in which the Court
deemed a state rule or practice manifestly unreliable or unfair"). It is also possible that the
Court's pragmatic, hands-off approach to mitigation derives from Justice Harlan's recogni-
tion in McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 204 (1971), that advance identification of
factors that should sway the capital decision appears to be a task "beyond present human
ability."
42. See Acker & Lanier, supra note 39, at 304.
43. See, e.g., Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982) (sixteen-year-old defendant).
44. See, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (childhood beatings suffered by
mentally retarded defendant).
45. See, e.g., Lockett, 438 U.S. at 586 (defendant's lack of intent to kill and relatively mi-
nor participation in robbery-murder).
46. See id. at 604. See generally Acker & Lanier, supra note 39, at 305 (describing ration-
ale of "future dangerousness" mitigation evidence).
47. See Acker & Lanier, supra note 39, at 305-06. The role of "character" in sentencing
has deep roots in the common law and Western philosophy. Eighteenth century philosopher
David Hume wrote:
[A]ctions are, by their very nature, temporary and perishing; and where they proceed
not from some cause in the character and disposition of the person who performed
them, they can neither redound to his honor, if good, nor infamy, if evil .... For as
actions are objects of our moral sentiment so far only as they are indications of the
internal character, passions, and affections ....
DAVID HUME, AN INQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 107-08 (Henry Regnery
ed., 1955); see also FLETCHER, supra note 22, at 800 (1978) ("[A] judgment about character is
essential to thejust distribution of punishment.").
48. See Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 178 (1988).
49. As Justice Kennedy has remarked, during the penalty phase "the sentencer must
attempt to know 'he heart and mind of the offender and judge his character....
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receptiveness to mitigating evidence relating to the defendant's
proclivity for "voluntary service, kindness to others, or of religious
devotion,""0 record of good behavior while in jail pending trial,"
and even ability to dance. Of most significance to the discussion
here, the Court held in Hitchcock v. Dugger5 that the lower court's
failure to permit consideration of evidence that the defendant was
a "fond and affectionate uncle" was constitutional error. State
courts have repeatedly recognized this worth as well and accorded
mitigating weight to evidence of defendant's love for or devotion to
family and friends," and, conversely, family and friends' love for or
[A] ssessments of character and remorse may carry great weight and, perhaps, be determina-
tive of whether the offender lives or dies." Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 144 (1992)
(Kennedy,J., concurring).
"Character evidence" gets before the jury in any of several ways. Most typically, although
the capital laws of many states expressly prescribe that a defendant's "character" be
"considered," see Acker & Lanier, supra note 39, at 311, such evidence gets before the jury as
a non-statutory mitigator. See Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 398-99 (1987) (holding
that non-statutory mitigating circumstances may not be precluded from sentencing deci-
sion). Alternatively, the jury can receive character evidence by means of the so-called "catch-
all" statutory mitigator. See Acker & Lanier, supra note 39, at 338-39.
50. Franklin, 487 U.S. at 186 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
51. See Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 5 (1986).
52. See Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 382 n.5 (1990). Although certainly an expan-
sive category, the extent of relevant character evidence is not without limit. See, e.g., Skipper,
476 U.S. at 7 n.2 ("[W]e have no quarrel with the statement of the Supreme Court of South
Carolina that 'how often [the defendant] will take a shower' is irrelevant to the sentencing
determination.").
53. 481 U.S. 393, 397 (1987); see also Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 814 (1991)
(acknowledging consideration of mitigating evidence that defendant was good with children
and had worked with his father as a painter).
54. See, e.g., Myers v. State, 699 So. 2d 1281, 1284 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996); State v.
Mann, 934 P.2d 784, 792 (Ariz. 1997); State v. Ramirez, 871 P.2d 237, 243 (Ariz. 1994) (en
banc); Sheridan v. State, 852 S.W.2d 772, 779 (Ark. 1993); Banks v. State, 700 So. 2d 363,
365 (Fla. 1997); Washington v. State, 653 So. 2d 362, 366 (Fla. 1994); State v. Row, 955 P.2d
1082, 1088 (Idaho 1998); People v. Steidl, 685 N.E.2d 1335, 1344 (Ill. 1997); State v. Loftin,
680 A.2d 677, 713 (N.J. 1996); Rouse v. State, 451 S.E.2d 543, 556 (N.C. 1994); State v. Fox,
631 N.E.2d 124, 133 (Ohio 1994); State v. Lawrence, 541 N.E.2d 451, 460 (Ohio 1989).
Although the nature of such mitigation evidence bears basic similarities in cross-gender
terms, one commentator recently observed that societal expectations and traditional stereo-
types regarding women can have perverse effects on sentencing. "For women, these
character traits necessarily include gender traits such as the woman's exceptional mothering
skills, her nurturing traits, or her devotion to her husband." Jenny E. Carroll, Note, Images of
Women and Capital Sentencing Among Female Offenders: Exploring the Outer Limits of the Eighth
Amendment and Articulated Theories of Justice, 75 TEx. L. REv. 1413, 1445-46 (1997). Carroll
asserts that women, unlike men, are therefore held to a higher standard of domestic behav-
ior, risking juror assessments of "unworth" when evidence of satisfaction of such standards is
lacking. See id. at 1447. This situation "increases the risk that the sentence will be applied
arbitrarily based on the sentencer's preconceived notions of womanhood which may be
inherently exclusive of some capital defendants." Id.; see also id. at 1446 (noting that "in the
case of Karla Faye Tucker, in order to offset an impressive list of aggravators, Tucker's de-
fense team presented evidence of her loving care for her dying mother and her virtual
adoption of an abandoned child").
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devotion to the defendant.55 "Mutual love" as between the
defendant and his family and friends is also frequently given
mitigating weight.5 6 Failure to mount such potentially mitigating
evidence is sufficient basis for a finding of ineffective assistance of
counsel, 7 and the Seventh Circuit recently indicated that the sole
purpose of mitigation is to permit consideration of positive
55. See, e.g., Coral v. State, 628 So. 2d 988, 1002 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992); State v. King,
883 P.2d 1024, 1028-29 (Ariz. 1994) (en banc); People v. Hines, 938 P.2d 388, 406 (Cal.
1997); People v. Stanley, 897 P.2d 481, 519 (Cal. 1995) (en banc); People v. Crittenden, 885
P.2d 887, 932 (Cal. 1994) (en banc); Banks v. State, 700 So. 2d 363, 365 (Fla. 1997);
Thompson v. State, 648 So. 2d 692, 697 (Fla. 1994); Barnes v. State, 496 S.E.2d 674, 689 (Ga.
1998); State v. Loftin, 680 A.2d 677, 713 (N.J. 1996); State v. Williams, 679 N.E.2d 646, 662
(Ohio 1997); State v. Smith, 684 N.E.2d 668, 696 (Ohio 1997); State v. Dunlap, 652 N.E.2d
988, 998 (Ohio 1995); Romano v. State, 909 P.2d 92, 123 n.21 (Okla. Crim. App. 1996);
Plantz v. State, 876 P.2d 268, 282 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994); State v. Cauthern, 967 S.W.2d
726, 738-39 (Tenn. 1998); State v. Lord, 822 P.2d 177, 220 (Wash. 1991) (en banc); see also
Joseph P. Fried, Mother's Love, Despite "Terrible Crime," N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 1998, at B3
(describing emotional testimony of mother of defendant in first capital proceeding in New
York since the death penalty was reinstated in 1995).
56. See, e.g., People v. Stanley, 897 P.2d 481, 519 (Cal. 1995) (en banc); People v. Kelly,
800 P.2d 516, 540 n.12 (Cal. 1990) (en banc); State v. Manley, Nos.. 95-11007022, 95-
11006992, 1997 WL 27094, at *13 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 10, 1997); Foster v. State, 614 So. 2d
455, 461 (Fla. 1992); Carruthers v. State, 465 So. 2d 496, 498 (Fla. 1985); State v. Loftin, 680
A.2d 677, 706 (N.J. 1996).
Courts on occasion have even gone so far as to scrutinize the quality and extent of such
affection. The Arizona Supreme Court, for instance, while holding that "[love for and of
family may be a mitigating circumstance," recounted that defendant joined the military to
"get away from his father"; went "months without contacting" his mother; "admitted to hav-
ing differences with one of his brothers and a sister"; "ha[d] not seen his daughter for 10
years"; and was "twice divorced." State v. Spears, 908 P.2d 1062, 1079 (Ariz. 1996) (en banc).
The court concluded: "Although defendant may have proven that his mother loves him, we
conclude that in this case the support of third parties does not translate into a mitigating
circumstance for defendant." Id.; cf State v. Bishop, 472 S.E.2d 842, 859 (N.C. 1996)
(affirming lower court's refusal to submit to jury the non-statutory mitigator that the
"defendant's family loves and cares about the defendant," concluding that the
"circumstance relates only to defendant's family relationships in his childhood, not at the
time of the crime or of trial").
It is also apparent that a defendant's use of such evidence can backfire, with the prosecu-
tion arguing that even if defendant loved and/or was loved by others such love failed to
deter the (irredeemable) defendant from committing the murderous act. See State v. Wil-
liams, 904 P.2d 437, 454 (Ariz. 1995) (en banc); State v. King, 883 P.2d 1024, 1044-45 (Ariz.
1994) (en banc); State v. Carriger, 692 P.2d 991, 1011 (Ariz. 1984) (en banc); State v. Sim-
mons, 944 S.W.2d 165, 188 (Mo. 1997) (en banc); State v. Hicks, 538 N.E.2d 1030, 1039
(Ohio 1989).
In other instances, the fact that defendant has inspired the affection of others has been
conceived as a betrayal and in effect served as a defacto aggravating circumstance. See, e.g.,
State v. Ceja, 612 P.2d 491, 495 (Ariz. 1990) (en banc). Such a turnabout strategy would
appear to violate the Supreme Court's position that ostensibly mitigating evidence cannot
constitutionally be transformed into aggravating evidence. See Zant v. Stevens, 462 U.S. 862,
885 (1983).
57. See, e.g., Collier v. Turpin, 177 F.3d 1184, 1202-04 (11th Cir. 1999); Mak v. Blodg-
ett, 970 F.2d 614, 622 (9th Cir. 1992); Tyler v. Kemp, 755 F.2d 741, 745 (11th Cir. 1985);
People v. Steidl, 685 N.E.2d 1335, 1343-44 (Ill. 1997).
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character evidence, not to investigate "causality" (for example, the
influence of childhood abuse on defendant) .
In short, character evidence in capital trials, especially that relat-
ing to defendants' love for and by family and friends, plays a
critically important yet intangible role. 9 Carol and Jordan Steiker
observe that admission of such evidence is justified on two funda-
mental bases. The first is utilitarian, "forward-looking and
consequentialist. Evidence of a defendant's special talents or close
family ties may suggest the defendant's capacity to make continuing
58. See Eddmonds v. Peters, 93 F.3d 1307, 1321-22 (7th Cir. 1996); Stewart v. Gramley,
74 F.3d 132, 136-37 (7th Cir. 1996); see also Marc D. Hauser, Comment, Capital Mitigation
Evidence in the Seventh Circuit, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 1129 (1998) (condemning Circuit's failure
to recognize omission of available "causality evidence" as violative of Strickland).
59. The idea that by examining the emotional investment of third parties we gain un-
derstanding into the first person is of a long and distinguished philosophical tradition. See,
e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, IMMANUEL KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 131-40 (Norman Kemp
Smith trans., The Macmillan Press Ltd. 1973) (1787). But precisely why the love of another
should have mitigating value presents a complex philosophical question, perhaps explaining
why, although courts invariably admit such evidence in the name of mitigation, they rarely
articulate why they do so.
One explanation is that such love permits an inference that the defendant possesses some
human value or quality, as seen through the eyes of another, i.e., that affection presumes
virtue, and that the sentencer should be privy to this appreciation. See, e.g., People v. Ochoa,
966 P.2d 442, 506 (Cal. 1998) (noting that jury can take into account testimony from defen-
dant's mother that she "loves her son if it believes that he must possess redeeming qualities
to have earned his mother's love"); People v. Arias, 913 P.2d 980, 1035 (Cal. 1996)
(acknowledging defense counsel's argument that "the love [the witness] had expressed for
defendant was a reflection that he had some good qualities"); People v. Crittenden, 885 P.2d
887, 932 (Cal. 1994) (en banc) ("The evidence presented by the defense in mitigation, em-
phasizing primarily the love and respect defendant had engendered in his family and peers,
was not insubstantial."); see alsoJONATHAN LEAR, LOVE AND ITS PLACE IN NATURE: A PHILO-
SOPHICAL INTERPRETATION OF FREUDIAN ANALYSIS 186 (1990) (noting that from a Freudian
perspective, "man is not just a donor of love, he is also a recipient. It is in this give-and-take
that the human soul comes to be."); IRVING SINGER, THE NATURE OF LOVE: 3 THE MODERN
WORLD 13 (1987) (characterizing Platonic love as "a longing for the very idea of perfection,
which may or may not prevail against the material order in things").
Another explanation might stem from the idea that love is arguably finite in nature, and
of necessity is therefore distributed only in a discriminatory way. As noted by one commen-
tator, "[s]ince we cannot be all things to all people, our ability to love, let alone to love well,
is limited." Drucilla Cornell, Toward a Modern/Postmodern Reconstruction of Ethics, 133 U. PA. L.
REV. 291, 341 (1985). The recognition of "blind love," most often familial-based, would
appear to cut against this conceptualization. Indeed, courts have been known to bar, or
belittle, expressions of such family-based love that defendants have proffered in the name of
mitigation. See, e.g., Barnes v. State, 496 S.E.2d 674, 687 (Ga. 1998) (noting trial court's dis-
missive statement to the effect that "everybody loves their wife"). The reality is, however,
that not all capital defendants can, in fact, muster witnesses to evoke such loving sentiments,
and the absence of such favorable testimony can negatively influence jurors' perceptions of
defendants' worth. See Scott E. Sundby, The Jury as Critic: An Empirical Look at How Capital
Juries Perceive Expert and Lay Testimony, 83 VA. L. REV. 1109, 1151-52 (1997) (describing sur-
prise expressed by capital jurors in response to defendants' failure to mount "family love"
evidence, or otherwise commenting on its paltry nature or extent). This phenomenon is
examined at greater length infra at notes 250-58 and accompanying text.
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contributions to society." 6° The second is "retrospective and nonu-
tilitarian. Evidence of positive character traits and past good works
may reveal a defendant's 'general desert' and contribute to a moral
assessment of the defendant's entire life .... ,,61 In this latter sense,
character evidence humanizes a defendant, in stark contrast to the
State's typical strategy of dehumanizing or abstracting the defen-
dant from the human community, a strategy designed to make it
easier for the sentencer to render a sentence of death.62
II. THE COURT CREATES A SERIOUSLY IMBALANCED
CAPITAL JURISPRUDENCE
Traditionally, the primary objective in capital trials has been to
arrive at a "reasoned moral response" to the murderous act of the
defendant, tempered by his or her "deathworthiness." In theory,
this outcome is achieved by providing guidance in the considera-
tion of aggravating circumstances relating to the defendant and
the murder, and by permitting the sentencer virtually unlimited
consideration of mitigating evidence that might possibly favor a
sentence less than death. In recent years, however, the Rehnquist
Court has recalibrated in fundamental ways the already emotional,
high-stakes death penalty process, distancing itself from Locketfts
predominant focus on the defendant and his act, and making an
already death-prone system considerably much more so.
A. Brown, Parks, and Payne
Although this recalibration has stemmed from several of the
Court's decisions, the interplay of three in particular, each having
to do with the nature of evidence put before capital juries, and
how they make use of it, will be addressed here. In California v.
Brown, decided in 1987, the Court addressed whether a capital jury
can be instructed that its deliberation "'must not be swayed by
mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public
opinion or public feeling.' ,63 Writing for the five-member majority,
60. Steiker & Steiker, Let God Sort Them Out?, supra note 36, at 847.
61. Id.
62. This point, and the related role of emotion and narrative in death penalty pro-
ceedings, is addressed at length at infra notes 237-65 and accompanying text.
63. 479 U.S. 538, 540 (1987).
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Chief Justice Rehnquist approved of the instruction insofar as it
prohibited "mere sympathy," divorced from the aggravating and
mitigating evidence.64 Dissenting, Justice Brennan argued that
"[i] n forbidding the sentencer to take sympathy into account, this
language on its face precludes precisely the response that a defen-
dant's evidence of character and background is designed to elicit,
thus effectively negating the intended effect of the Court's re-
quirement that all mitigating evidence be considered.
6 5
In Saffle v. Parks, decided in 1990, the Court addressed a near-
identical instruction that the jury should "'avoid any influence of
sympathy, sentiment, passion, prejudice, or other arbitrary factor
when imposing sentence."' 66 The Court upheld the instruction,
noting that while the State cannot prevent defendants from prof-
fering relevant mitigating evidence, it can instruct jurors in the way
they are to conceive of such evidence by admonishing that they
cannot defer to sympathy-even if evoked by the mitigating evi-
dence.67
Parks and Brown combined thus present a paradox: while capital
jurors must receive and consider defendants' mitigating
evidence-evidence proffered "as a basis for a sentence less than
death"s-they can be instructed to refrain from investing any
emotional meaning in it, at least not in the form of sympathy for
the defendant's human situation. 9
In 1991 came the third and most significant case in the triumvi-
rate, Payne v. Tennessee," where the Court granted certiorari to
reconsider its very recent holdings in Booth v. Maryland71 and South
Carolina v. Gathers72 barring "victim impact evidence" in capital tri-
als, testimony relating to the "personal characteristics of the victim
64. See id. at 542.
65. Id. at 548 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Concurring in the result, Justice O'Connor ac-
knowledged that "one difficulty with attempts to remove emotion from capital sentencing
through instructions.., is that juries may be misled into believing that mitigating evidence
about a defendant's background or character also must be ignored." Id. at 545-46
(O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor's fears were allayed because the jury in Brown
was reminded of its constitutional responsibility to consider the defendant's mitigating evi-
dence. See id. at 546.
66. 494 US. 484, 487 (1990).
67. See id. at 490.
68. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978).
69. In 1993, the Court as a whole articulated the position even more forcefully: capital
juries need not be permitted to "dispense mercy on the basis of a sympathetic response to
the defendant."Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 371 (1993).
70. 501 U.S. 808, 817 (1991).
71. 482 U.S. 496 (1987).
72. 490 U.S. 805 (1989).
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and the emotional impact of the crimes on the victim's family."73 In
Booth, the majority characterized such evidence as "irrelevant," and
flatly rejected the State of Maryland's assertion that it was needed
to permit jurors to assess the "gravity" of the offense.74 Writing for
the Booth Court, Justice Powell condemned victim impact evidence
because it refocused the sentencing decision from the defendant
and his crime to "the character and reputation of the victim and
the effect on his family," despite the fact that the defendant may
have been wholly unaware of the personal qualities and worth of
the victim. 5 In so doing, Justice Powell asserted, the State created
"a constitutionally unacceptable risk that the jury may impose the
death penalty in an arbitrary and capricious manner" in violation
of the Eighth Amendment.
76
Bespeaking the compelling allure of victim impact evidence, the
State of Tennessee, in the face of Booth's unequivocal holding, em-
ployed victim evidence in its 1988 trial of Pervis Payne for the
stabbing deaths of Charisse Christopher and her two-year-old
daughter (witnessed by her three-year-old son, himself brutally but
non-fatally stabbed) . Upon winning convictions on all counts, at
sentencing the State presented the testimony of Ms. Christopher's
mother, who testified how her grandson had been affected by the
murders of his mother and sister:
He cries for his mom. He doesn't seem to understand why she
doesn't come home. And he cries for his sister Lacie. He
73. Payne, 501 U.S. at 817.
74. See Booth, 482 U.S. at 504.
75. See id.
76. See id. at 503. Booth also barred on Eighth Amendment grounds testimony concern-
ing survivors' personal opinions of the defendant, their impressions of the crime, and their
views with respect to appropriate sentence. According to Justice Powell
this information by the State can serve no other purpose than to inflame the jury and
divert it from deciding the case on the relevant evidence concerning the crime and
the defendant .... The admission of these emotionally-charged opinions as to what
conclusions the jury should draw from the evidence clearly is inconsistent with the
reasoned decisionmaking we require in capital cases.
Id. at 508-09 (citing to survivor testimony that likened defendants to "animals," that the
elderly decedents had been "butchered," and that defendant could never be rehabilitated).
In South Carolina v. Gathers, decided two years after Booth, the Court addressed the propri-
ety of an emotional closing statement by a prosecutor that praised, inter alia, the religiosity
and civic-mindedness of the decedent, a self-styled "Reverend Minister." See South Carolina
v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 808-10 (1989). Although not testimony from survivors, as in Booth,
the Court considered the statements "indistinguishable" in their effect and hence impermis-
sible. See id. at 811.
77. See State v. Payne, 791 S.W.2d 10, 18-19 (Tenn. 1990).
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comes to me many times during the week and asks me,
Grandmama, do you miss my Lacie. And I tell him yes. He
says, I'm worried about my Lacie.
The prosecutor elaborated on the boy's condition during the
State's closing argument:
Nicholas was alive. ... [H] is eyes were open .... [H]e was
able to hold his intestines in as he was carried to the ambu-
lance. So he knew what happened to his mother and baby
sister.
There is nothing you can do to ease the pain of any of the
families involved in this case.... But there is something you
can do for Nicholas.
Somewhere down the road Nicholas is going to grow up,
hopefully.... He is going to want to know what type of justice
was done. He is going to want to know what happened. With
your verdict, you will provide the answer.79
In his rebuttal the prosecutor argued:
No one will ever know about Lacie Jo because she never had
the chance to grow up. ... And there won't be anybody
there-there won't be her mother there or Nicholas' mother
there to kiss him at night. His mother will never kiss him good
night or pat him as he goes off to bed, or hold him and sing
him a lullaby.
[Petitioner's attorney] wants you to think about ... people
who love the defendant and things about him. He doesn't
want you to think about the people who love Charisse Chris-
topher, her mother and daddy who loved her. The people
who loved little Lacie Jo, the grandparents who are still here.
The brother who mourns for her every single day and wants to
know where his best little playmate is. He doesn't have any-
body to watch cartoons with him, a little one. These are the
things that.., that child will carry forever.0
78. Payne, 501 U.s at 814-15.
79. Id. at 815.
80. Id. at 816.
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The jury sentenced Payne to death on both murder counts and the
Supreme Court of Tennessee affirmed."
Over the vigorous dissents of Justices Stevens and Marshall, with
Justice Marshall describing the majority's opinion as the triumph
of "[p]ower, not reason,"82 a six-member majority of the Court
overruled Booth and Gathers and affirmed Payne's death sentences.
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist first disputed the
premise of Booth and Gathers that "evidence relating to a particular
victim or to the harm that a capital defendant causes a victim's
family" is immaterial . Although "this particular kind of evi-
dence-designed to portray for the sentencing authority the actual
harm caused by a particular crime-is of recent origin," the Chief
Justice reasoned, "this fact hardly renders it unconstitutional." 4
"Victim impact evidence is simply another form or method of in-
forming the sentencing authority about the specific harm caused
by the crime in question, evidence of a general type long consid-
ered by sentencing authorities."-
The second, more practical reason for admitting victim impact
evidence was to rectify what the Payne majority perceived as an
accumulated gross evidentiary imbalance in the capital decision-
making process. Because Lockett and Woodson granted capital
defendants the unfettered right to proffer relevant mitigating
evidence, in the name of showing their "uniqueness" and lessened
personal culpability, fairness compelled that evidence relating to
the "uniqueness" of the life taken by the defendant also be
considered in death decisions. Citing Justice White's dissent in
81. See Payne, 791 S.W.2d at 19-21 (holding that the admission of the victim impact
evidence and related argument by the prosecution was harmless error).
82. Payne, 501 U.S. at 844 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun joined in Justice
Marshall's dissent. See id. Justice Stevens dissented separately, with Justice Blackmun joining
in his dissent as well. See id. at 856 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In the intervening years between
Booth and Payne, Justice Anthony Kennedy replaced Booth's author, Lewis Powell, and Justice
David Souter took the seat of Justice William Brennan. With Justice White, who had grudg-
ingly sided with the majority in Gathers on stare decisis grounds, the 6-3 Payne majority took
form.
The uncertain precedential status of Booth and Gathers was in fact signaled in the Court's
prior term, in 1990, when the Court agreed to reexamine the decisions with its grant of
certiorari in Ohio v. Huertas, 498 U.S. 807 (1990). The Court, however, dismissed the writ as
improvidently granted one week after oral arguments. See Ohio v. Huertas, 498 U.S. 336
(1991).
83. Payne, 501 U.S. at 819.
84. Id. at 821.
85. Id. at 825.
86. See id. at 826 ("[T] here is nothing unfair about allowing the jury to bear in mind
that harm at the same time as it considers the mitigating evidence introduced by the defen-
dant.").
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Booth, Chief Justice Rehnquist lauded the leveling effect that such
emotional evidence can have:
"[T]he state has a legitimate interest in counteracting the
mitigating evidence which the defendant is entitled to put in,
by reminding the sentencer that just as the murderer should
be considered as an individual, so too the victim is an individ-
ual whose death represents a unique loss to society and in
particular to his family."
8 7
To the Payne majority, Booth "unfairly weighted the scales in a
capital trial,"'' insofar as precluding victim impact evidence
"deprives the State of the full moral force of its evidence and may
prevent the jury from having before it all the information necessary
to determine the proper punishment for a first-degree murder."8 9
Quoting the venerable Justice Benjamin Cardozo, Chief Justice
Rehnquist summarized the majority's position: "'J]ustice, though
due to the accused, is due to the accuser also. The concept of fair-
ness must not be strained till it is narrowed to a filament. We are to
keep the balance true."' 90 Victim impact evidence, the Chief Justice
added, would run afoul of the Constitution only when it is "so un-
duly prejudicial that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair" for
Fourteenth Amendment due process purposes.91
87. Id. at 825 (quoting Maryland v. Booth, 482 U.S. 496, 517 (1987) (White,J., dissent-
ing)).
88. Id. at 809. This same sentiment was echoed in the concurrences of Justices
O'Connor and Souter. See id. at 832 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[Murder takes] away all
that is special and unique about the person. The Constitution does not preclude a state
from deciding to give some of that back."); id. at 839 (Souter, J., concurring) ("[G] iven a
defendant's option to introduce relevant evidence in mitigation ... sentencing without such
evidence of victim impact may be seen as a significantly imbalanced process.").
89. Id. at 825. For identical reasons, the majority reversed Gathers, thereby permitting
prosecutors'jury arguments centering on victim impact. See id. at 827.
90. Id. at 827 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 122 (1934) (Cardozo,J.)).
91. Id. at 825. In addition to stemming from a basic shift in the Court's membership
and ideological orientation, as George Fletcher has observed, Payne's jurisprudential about-
face evidenced an emerging confidence with respect to the constitutional availability of the
death penalty itself:
The role of the victim in capital sentencing was, in the past, subject to careful scrutiny
and tight discipline because the Supreme Court was anxious about the constitutional-
ity of the death penalty. Yet by 1991, with the appointment of a more staunchly
conservative Court, capital punishment seemed relatively safe from constitutional at-
tack and the Court undertook to re-examine precedents, such as those related to the
role of the victim, designed to minimize the risk of "arbitrary" sentencing.
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(1995). Indeed, Payne provides yet further evidence of the Court's gradual disavowal of the
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Taken together, Brown, Parks, and Payne evince a notable shift in
emphasis in the Court's capital sentencing jurisprudence. By at
once allowing jurors to be precluded from acting on any feelings of
sympathy for defendants, negligible though such sentiments may
be, and allowing highly emotional victim impact evidence oriented
toward inducing empathic concern for the victim, the Court has
"allow[ed] a jury's emotions to be driven toward a death determi-
nation."92 As discussed next, the effects of Payne in particular are
being felt in capital trials.
B. Payne 's Influence
Although Payne merely lifted the "per se" Eighth Amendment
bar against victim impact evidence (VIE), and did not require its
• * 93
admission, VIE has become a staple in the State's prosecutorial
arsenal.94 At least thirty-two of the thirty-eight death penalty states,95
and the federal government,9 now permit VIE in a broad diversity
idea that "death is different," insofar as victim impact evidence is now allowed in capital and
non-capital trials alike. Support for this is found in the majority opinion in Booth itself, which
was at pains to emphasize that the decision did not affect the use of victim impact evidence
in non-capital trials, guided as it was by "the fact death is a 'punishment different from all
other sanctions.'" Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 509 n.12 (1987) (citation omitted).
92. Susan Raeker-Jordan, A Pro-Death, Self-Fulfilling Constitutional Construct: The Supreme
Court's Evolving Standard of Decency for the Death Penalty, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 455, 514
(1996); see also Dubber, Tender Heart, supra note 17, at 129 ("Payne illustrates the awesome
combined impact of an antisympathy instruction... and a barrage of victim impact evidence
that opens the floodgates of compassion for victims and their famil[ies]."). Chief Justice
Rehnquist appeared to recognize this outcome in Brown, observing that jurors' reliance on
"emotional factors would be far more likely to turn the jury against a capital defendant than
for him." Brown, 479 U.S. at 543.
93. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 827 ("We thus hold that if the State chooses to permit the
admission of victim impact evidence and prosecutorial argument on that subject, the Eighth
Amendment erects no per se bar."); id. at 831 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("We do not hold
today that victim impact evidence must be admitted, or even that it should be admitted.").
94. A recent capital proceeding in Florida underscores this dominant role. In a pre-
trial motion, the defense successfully argued that, in the event of conviction, victim impact
evidence should be excluded due to its inherently prejudicial nature. The Florida Court of
Appeals reversed. Citing Florida's victims' rights constitutional amendment and victim im-
pact evidence statute, the court condemned the "blanket" preclusion, and held that the
State was legally entitled to proffer such evidence, subject to judicial scrutiny for undue
prejudice in its particularity. See State v. Johnston, 743 So. 2d 22, 23-24 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1999).
95. See Amy K. Phillips, Comment, Thou Shall Not Kill Any Nice People: The Problem of Vic-
tim Impact Statements in Capital Sentencing, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 93, 99-100 (1998).
96. See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(a) (1994). Once again emphasizing the great allure of victim
impact evidence, the U.S. Congress itself intervened in the death penalty proceeding against
Oklahoma City bombing defendant Timothy McVeigh to ensure a prominent role for survi-
vors. Judge Richard Matsch, unable to derive clear guidance from Payne as to where the line
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of forms. Furthermore, consistent with Payne's notable reticence as
to the permissible bounds of VIE, jurisdictions have imposed re-
markably few procedural or substantive limits on its use.9 Indeed,
at times there is no requirement that defendants be notified in ad-
vance that VIE will be introduced,9 9 and the vast majority place no
limits on how the emotionally powerful evidence is presented to
jurors, permitting videotapes, poems, diary entries, and a litany of
other methods.'00 Nor are limits imposed on the number or scope
of persons allowed to testify, permitting friends, neighbors, co-wokrs n "o mniy 102
workers, and "community" representatives to provide gripping
between appropriate victim impact testimony and an appeal to passion begins, excluded
from the proceedings survivors who would testify at the penalty phase. In the immediate
wake of Judge Matsch's ruling, under intense pressure from victims' family members, Con-
gress quickly undid the ruling. See 18 U.S.C. § 3510 (Supp. 1998); John Gibeaut, The Last
Word:Jury Is Still Out on Effects of Victim Impact Testimony, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1997, at 42-43; see also
Jeffrey Toobin, Victim Power, THE NEW YORKER, Mar. 24, 1997, at 40-43 (describing influence
of Oklahoma City bombing victims in McVeigh trial and that of the victim lobby more gener-
ally in Congress).
97. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 825 (stating, without elaboration, that evidence cannot be so
"unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair" for due process purposes).
98. See, e.g., United States v. Glover, 43 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1235 (D. Kan. 1999) ("noting
that "[a]lthough Congress expressly provided for the jury's consideration of victim impact
evidence [in the Federal Death Penalty Act), it did not put any limits on what can be con-
sidered"). Any limits on the reach and nature of impact evidence are solely "a matter for the
court's discretion and must be determined with consideration for the constitutional limita-
tion that the jury must not be influenced by passion or prejudice." United States v. McVeigh,
944 F. Supp. 1478, 1491 (D. Colo. 1996).
99. See, e.g., Bowling v. Commonwealth, 942 S.W.2d 293, 302 (Ky. 1997); State v. Hum-
phries, 479 S.E.2d 52, 55 (S.C. 1996).
100. See, e.g., Noel v. State, 960 S.W.2d 439, 446 (Ark. 1998) (permitting mother of the
decedent to read a poem she wrote entitled "Wishes from the Heart," which in her words
she "used as a tool to suppress the hurt and pain because sometimes it is so overwhelming");
Hicks v. State, 940 S.W.2d 855, 857 (Ark. 1997) (permitting 14-minute videotape narrated by
victim's brother spanning victim's life, containing 160 photographs); State v. Roberts, 948
S.W.2d 577, 604 (Mo. 1997) (en banc) (permitting items "hand-crafted" by the victim), cert.
denied, 522 U.S. 1056 (1998); State v. Basile, 942 S.W.2d 342, 358 (Mo. 1997) (en banc)
(permitting letters, stories, diary entries, and poem), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 833 (1998).
101. See, e.g., Nooner v. State, 907 S.W.2d 677, 688-89 (Ark. 1995) (noting that those
qualified to testify "may range from the victim's family to those close to that person who
were profoundly impacted by his death"); Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249, 262 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1998) (en banc) (stating that "[miore distantly related family members, close friends,
or co-workers may, in a given case, provide legitimate testimony"); Beck v. Commonwealth,
484 S.E.2d 898, 904-06 (Va. 1997) (noting that an impact witness must only not be "so far
removed from the victims as to have nothing of value to impart to the court about the im-
pact of these crimes").
102. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 921.141(7) (1998) (noting that impact evidence is
"designed to demonstrate the victim's uniqueness ... and the resultant loss to the commu-
nity's members by the victim's death"); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9721(b) (West 1998)
(permitting evidence of the "gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on the life of
the victim and on the community"); McClain v. State, 477 S.E.2d 814, 824 (Ga. 1996)
(allowing evidence of "community" impact based on response to radio call-in show). This
expansive approach is in sharp contrast to the facts of Payne itself, which involved the
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testimony on how the death has affected their lives. For instance,
in the federal trials of Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols, con-
victed of the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in
Oklahoma City in which 168 people died, jurors heard from thirty-
eight impact witnesses in McVeigh0 3 and fifty-five in Nichols.0 4 In-
cluded in this group were numerous professional rescue workers
who extricated innocents from the mass of rubble.' On appeal,
the Tenth Circuit in McVeigh commended the government for its
"self-restraint" in the number of impact witnesses called, and of-
fered that "It]he sheer number of actual victims and the horrific
things done to them necessarily allows for the introduction of a
greater amount of victim impact testimony in order for the gov-
ernment to show the 'harm' caused by the crime." 1
06
Even more troubling, the parameters of "impact" betray any
semblance of realistic limit. With only a few exceptions, 1 7 juris-
dictions fail to provide any guidance whatsoever on the
permissible breadth or substantive content of VIE. In McVeigh, for
instance, the Tenth Circuit upheld the torrent of impact evi-
dence submitted, which included "last contacts" with the victim
evidence; "efforts to discover the fate of the victims" evidence;
and "pure love and innocence of children" evidence. 0t The latter
emotional and psychological impact on a three-year-old boy as briefly testified to by his
grandmother. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 814-16.
103. United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1216 (10th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.
Ct. 1148 (1999).
104. See Jo Thomas, Emotion Fills Courtroom as Judge Calls for None, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1,
1998, at A10.
105. See Scott Robinson, Editorial, Stacking the Deck: Heart-Wrenching "Victim Impact"
Statements Make It Virtually Impossible for Jurors to Set Emotions Aside, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS,
June 8, 1997, at 1B (discussing testimony from rescue and medical workers in McVeigh);
Thomas, supra note 104, at A10 (discussing same regarding Nichols).
106. McVeigh, 153 F.3d at 1221.
107. Several jurisdictions do limit impact evidence, but the criteria themselves are nota-
ble for their indefinite quality. See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-155(b) (1994) (limiting to
"the financial, emotional, and physical effects of the crime on the victim and the victim's
family"); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 180-9.3(5) (West 1997) (limiting to the "physical or psy-
chological harm or financial loss suffered by the victim"); Cargle v. State, 909 P.2d 806, 828
(Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (limiting to "those unique characteristics which define the individ-
ual who has died, the contemporaneous and prospective circumstances surrounding that
death, and how those circumstances have financially, emotionally, psychologically, and
physically impacted on members of the victim's immediate family"); State v. Nesbit, 978
S.W.2d 872, 891 (Tenn. 1998) (limiting to the "contemporaneous and prospective circum-
stances surrounding the individual's death, and how those circumstances financially,
emotionally, psychologically or physically impacted upon members of the victim's immediate
family"). Compare 18 U.S.C. § 3593(a) (1994) (permitting evidence revealing "the extent and
scope of the injury and loss suffered by the victim and the victim's family, and any other
relevant information").
108. McVeigh, 153 F.3d at 1219-20.
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category contained such heartrending stories as that of a little
girl who had been outside the Murrah Building when the bomb
exploded, and later approached a police officer and his dog,
hugged the dog, and asked, "Mr. Police Dog, will you find my
friends?"'" Stretching "impact" further still, the Eleventh Circuit
recently approved of testimony from three prison guards relating
to the effects the killing of a fellow guard had on inmate behavior
and daily prison life.'10 Other courts have even permitted evi-
dence of emotional harm stemming from unrelated killings
allegedly committed by the defendant, a practice that hardly evi-
dences the "uniqueness" of the defendant's instant victim."'
"Impact" can often assume a decidedly more macabre form as
well. In a recent South Carolina case, for instance, the State suc-
cessfully introduced photos of a stillborn child dressed in clothes
the victim-mother "intended for him to wear home from the hospi-
tal" in the name of "portray[ing] the individuality of the unborn
109. Id. at 1220.
110. See United States v. Battle, 173 F.3d 1343, 1348 (11th Cir. 1999). According to the
court:
the guards' testimony told the jury that the harm caused ... was not simply to take a
life, but also to embolden other prisoners to increase the harassment of guards by
prisoners, and to increase the stresses on the prison staff (making them feel less safe)
in the peculiar environment of a prison ....
Id. at 1348 n.6; see also Hyde v. State, No. CR-95-2036, 1998 WL 32605, at *10 (Ala. Grim.
App. Jan. 30, 1998) (allowing impact evidence regarding the effect the killing had on the
"law enforcement community"); Lambert v. State, 643 N.E.2d 349, 354-56 (Ind. 1994)
(allowing testimony from state trooper that, after a fellow trooper was killed, their chief no
longer functioned well and certain troopers began to deal with the public in improper
ways).
111. See People v. Dunlap, 975 P.2d 723, 745-46 (Colo. 1999) (en banc) (finding harm-
less error); People v. Hope, 702 N.E.2d 1282, 1288-89 (Ill. 1998) (same); Sherman v. State,
965 P.2d 903, 914 (Nev. 1998) (same); Gilbert v. State, 951 P.2d 98, 117 (Okla. Grim. App.
1997) (same). The North Carolina Supreme Court has squarely approved of impact evi-
dence relating to the emotional suffering of the children of another woman killed by the
defendant years before on the reasoning that such evidence "readily applie [d] to the moth-
erless child resulting" from the instant murders. See State v. Robinson, 451 S.E.2d 196, 205
(N.C. 1994); cf. Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1, 11-14 (1994) (denying Eighth Amend-
ment and due process challenges to death sentence based in part on jurors' consideration of
prior death judgment imposed on defendant).
The courts have also been receptive to VIE relating to contemporaneous non-capital
crimes committed by capital defendants. The Supreme Court of Ohio, for instance, has held
that "Payne clearly allows such testimony when the crimes are so interrelated that victims are
affected by more than just the capital death." State v. White, 709 N.E.2d 140, 155 (Ohio
1999). This liberality is consistent with the more general judicial tendency to admit "other
crimes" evidence in capital sentencings, even those of an unadjudicated nature. See Steven
Paul Smith, Note, Unreliable and Prejudicial: The Use of Extraneous Unadjudicated Offenses in the
Penalty Phases of Capital Trials, 93 COLUM. L. Rav. 1249 (1993) (surveying the law of 16 states
that permit admission of unadjudicated offenses at sentencing).
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child. Since the child was murdered before he was born, there was
no other way to vividly present his uniqueness to the jury." '112 The
North Carolina Supreme Court has invoked Payne to uphold the
admission of photos of the victims' decomposed bodies because
they "were unique individuals whose death represents a unique loss
to their families."' 13 Similarly, in the penalty phase of Nichols, pro-
fessional rescue workers testified at length of nightmares resulting
from having seen "children who had been torn apart and watched
blood and remains run down the walls of the ruined building."
1
'
4
The foregoing examples may be said to constitute expected con-
sequences of killings. However, VIE also commonly relates to far less
foreseeable outcomes, raising the obvious risk, identified by Justice
Powell in Booth, that jurors will "impos[e] the death sentence be-
cause of factors about which the defendant was unaware, and that
were irrelevant to the decision to kill." 1 5 The Texas Court of Crimi-
nal Appeals, for instance, has deemed "tenuous" but admissible the
fact that the victim's sister experienced a divorce in the wake of the
killing," 6 while the Missouri Supreme Court has permitted testimony
that the victim's family had previously endured the loss of another
child as a result of cerebral palsy." 7 Along these same lines, courts
regularly condone admission of VIE going to untoward medical
events experienced by loved ones subsequent to the crime.""
"Victim characteristic" evidence, which the Payne majority stated is
"designed to show ... each victim's uniqueness as an individual hu-
112. State v. Ard, 505 S.E.2d 328, 332 (S.C. 1998).
113. State v. Conaway, 453 S.E.2d 824, 849 (N.C. 1995). Similarly, the Illinois Supreme
Court has upheld admission of emotional testimony to the effect that the child-victims were
buried in the same caskets as their mothers. See People v. Kitchen, 636 N.E.2d 433, 447-48
(Ill. 1994).
114. Thomas, supra note 104, atA10.
115. Maryland v. Booth, 482 U.S. 496, 505 (1987); see also Alan C. Michaels, Constitu-
tional Innocence, 112 HARV. L. REV. 828, 893 n.339 (1999) (stating that under such
circumstances in effect the jury "choose[s] between life and death ... on the basis of 'strict
liability' with regard to the impact of the homicide").
At present, Tennessee appears to be the sole jurisdiction to attach special probative
weight to the fact that the defendant had prior "specific knowledge about the victim's
[immediate] family." State v. Nesbit, 978 S.W.2d 872, 892 (Tenn. 1998). Tennessee courts
use such advance knowledge, to the extent it can be surmised, to assess whether the proba-
tive value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by its admittedly prejudicial effect. See
id. at 891. In the words of the Tennessee Supreme Court, "probative value is particularly
great, where the proof shows ... that a defendant had specific knowledge about the victim's
family when the crime was committed." Id. at 893.
116. See McDuffv. State, 939 S.W.2d 607, 620 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
117. See State v. Clay, 975 S.W.2d 121, 132 (Mo. 1998).
118. See, e.g., Young v. State, 992 P.2d 332, 342 (Okla. Crim. App. 1998) (permitting
evidence of fatal heart attack suffered by victim's aunt upon receiving news of the killing);
Griffith v. State, 983 S.W.2d 282, 289 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (en banc) (permitting evi-
dence relating that father of victim "quit fighting" cancer after victim's killing).
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man being,"19 also regularly comes before capital juries in highly
prejudicial form. For instance, testimony that the decedent was a
"martyr" (while defendant was "evil");' 20 a nationally recognized pi-
ano player;12' a "smart person" with a "higher I.Q." than others in her
family;2 2 a "minister who read and carried a Bible everyday";123 a
"good man";2 4 and a person without a "hateful bone in her body," 2
has all been held admissible. This occurs despite Payne's repudiation
of "comparative judgments" as between the decedent and the con-
demned murderer, 26 and the mounting body of empirical evidence
119. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 823 (1991).
120. State v. Larry, 481 S.E.2d 907, 925 (N.C. 1997); see also Powell v. State, 906 P.2d
765, 776 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (characterizing victim inter alia as "good kid" who was
"clean cut" and "active in his church" and defendants as "bad kids" held harmless error).
121. See Whittlesey v. State, 655 A.2d 223, 250 (Md. 1994).
122. State v. Frost, 727 So. 2d 417, 431 (La. 1998).
123. State v. Shurn, 866 S.W.2d 447, 470 (Mo. 1993); see also Turner v. State, 486 S.E.2d
839, 842 (Ga. 1997) (victim had "new found faith and spirituality" and was "dedicated mem-
ber of his church family"); State v. Koon, 704 So. 2d 756, 773-74 (La. 1997) (approving of
statement that "[r]eligion was very paramount" in the victims' lives and extensive testimony
that victims were highly dedicated to Catholic Church and its activities); Lucas v. Evatt, 416
S.E.2d 646, 648 (S.C. 1992) (describing victims as "God fearing people"). The Georgia Su-
preme Court, faced with extensive references to the religiosity of the deceased, a deputy
sheriff, recently concluded that just as there is no "limit on the number of pages of victim
impact statements, neither.. . [is there an] outer limit[] for religious references." Pickren v.
State, 500 S.E.2d 566, 568 (Ga. 1998).
The unfettered admission of evidence relating to victims' religiosity, compared against
the very irreligious behavior of convicted murderers, raises significant risk of undue preju-
dice. This risk is especially present among religiously devout jurors. See Brian C. Duffey,
Note, Barring Foul Blows: An Argument for a Per Se Reversible-Error Rule for Prosecutors' Use of Relig-
ious Arguments in the Sentencing Phase of Capital Cases, 50 VAND. L. REv. 1335, 1356-60 (1997)
(discussing prejudicial effects of religion-based arguments by the state in capital trials).
124. Moore v. State, 701 So. 2d 545, 550 (Fla. 1997); Le v. State, 947 P.2d 535, 551
(Okla. Crim. App. 1997); see also State v. Simpson, 479 S.E.2d 57, 60 (S.C. 1997) (admitting
testimony extolling positive qualities of the victim, who was a husband and father); State v.
Hurley, 876 S.W.2d 57, 67 (Tenn. 1993) (admitting testimony of mother of five children that
her father was a "retired Sergeant Major who had served 26 years in special forces as a Green
Beret").
125. State v. Gray, 887 S.W.2d 369, 389 (Mo. 1994) (en banc).
126. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 823 (1991) (stating that "[als a general mat-
ter ... victim impact evidence is not offered to encourage comparative judgments of this
kind .... It is designed to show instead each victim's uniqueness as an individual human
being.").
That victim "uniqueness" evidence is necessary, as a fundamental matter, was forcefully
challenged by Justice Stevens who, in his Payne dissent, observed that "[t] he fact that each of
us is unique is a proposition so obvious that it surely requires no evidentiary support." Id. at
866 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Davenport v. State, 689 N.E.2d 1226, 1232-33 (Ind.
1997) ("The murder of a person carries with it an expected impact upon the family mem-
bers and other acquaintances of the victim. This impact is accounted for in the presumptive
sentence for murder."); Cargle v. State, 909 P.2d 806, 830 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) ("The
realities are, virtually everyone who is murdered is going to be missed by someone.... The
more a jury is exposed to the emotional aspects [the less likely due process will be satis-
fied]."). In the end, a cynic might observe, like Blackstone, that "the execution of a needy
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indicating that victim status plays a significant, prejudicial role in
death decisions.
2 7
Another concern stems from the proliferation of witness
"opinion" testimony. Although Payne seemingly left intact the Booth
proscription against survivors' (1) personal opinions of the
defendant and the crime, and (2) opinions as to proper
sentence,' the case law is rife with deviations. The Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals, for instance, has upheld a husband's
testimony that a "cur" or a "stray dog" did not deserve the death
suffered by his wife, and a daughter's reference to defendant as a
"piece of trash."m The Mississippi Supreme Court has squarely
concluded that the purpose of VIE is to "describe the victim's
personal characteristics, the emotional effect of the crimes on the
victim's family, and the family's opinions of the crimes and the
defendant." 0 In Louisiana, the State Supreme Court (in a novel
twist on the "anti-sympathy" instruction issue) has allowed
decrepit assassin is a poor satisfaction for the murder of a nobleman in the bloom of his
youth and full enjoyment of his friends, his honours, and his fortune." H.L.A. Hart, Punish-
ment and the Elimination of Responsibility, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 161 (1968).
127. See David C. Baldus et al., Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty in the Post-
Furman Era: An Empirical and Legal Overview, with Recent Findings from Philadelphia, 83
CORNELL L. REv. 1638, 1671 (1998) (finding that defendants whose victims possess more
than a "minimal" socio-economic status "face, on average, a distinctly higher risk of receiving
a death sentence than similarly situated defendants with victims of low" status); James C.
Beck & Robert Shumsky, A Comparison of Retained and Appointed Counsel in Cases of Capital
Murder, 21 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 525, 536 (1997) (analyzing Baldus data and also finding
increased likelihood of death imposition "when victim's social status was higher [rather]
than lower").
Not surprisingly, the data also support the corollary phenomenon: that victims with lower
socio-economic status are "devalued." See Baldus, supra, at 1715 (finding that a victim's low
status "has the substantial and statistically significant effect of reducing a defendant's likeli-
hood of receiving a death sentence"); Stephen P. Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation in
Capital Cases: What Do Jurors Think?, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1538, 1557 (1998) (finding that over
17% of capital jurors polled in South Carolina would treat as a mitigating factor evidence
that the victim "was a known troublemaker," and almost 11% would treat as mitigating the
fact that the victim "had a criminal record").
The influence of victim traits in sentencing decisions is evident in the context of non-
capital crimes as well. See LESLIE SEBBA, THIRD PARTIES: VICTIMS AND THE CRIMINALJUSTICE
SYSTEM 42 (1996) (citing studies); DonaldJ. Hall, Victims' Voices in Criminal Court: The Need
for Restraint, 28 Am. CRIM. L. REv. 233, 246 (1991) (same).
128. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 830 n.2; id. at 833 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 835 n.1
(Souter,J., concurring).
129. See Willingham v. State, 947 P.2d 1074, 1085-86 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997), cert. de-
nied sub nom. Thanh Le v. Oklahoma, 524 U.S. 930 (1998), overruled by Shrum v. State, 991
P.2d 1032 (Okla. Crim. App. 1999). For an incisive discussion of the various purposes and
effects of such derogatory terms in relation to defendants, see Martha Grace Duncan, In
Slime and Darkness: The Metaphor of Filth in CriminalJustice, 68 TUL. L. REv. 725 (1994).
130. Wells v. State, 698 So. 2d 497, 512 (Miss. 1997) (emphasis added).
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prosecutors to expressly ask whether survivors "have any sympathy"
for the killer of their loved one.1
3 1
A similar laxness pervades the ostensible limit placed on survi-
vors' sentence recommendations. Oklahoma, for instance,
expressly allows such testimony, as long as it is "limited to a simple
statement of the recommended sentence without amplification." 132
The Nevada Supreme Court recently condoned a wife's plea that
the jury "show no mercy," unanimously concluding that this was
not an "opinion" as to proper sentence but rather only a request
that the jury return the most severe verdict it felt appropriate.
33
Not surprisingly, VIE has a palpable emotional effect on jurors
13 4
and even supposedly impartial trial judges. For instance, in
McVeigh, the famously stoic Judge Richard Matsch openly wept over
the course of the two days of gripping VIE presented. 3 5 At the state
level, the Supreme Court of Delaware approved of a trial judge's
summary that the victim was a "generous, humble, and gracious
man who will be missed," 13 6 while the Illinois Supreme Court was
not troubled by a trial judge's comment that he had "never heard
victim impact statements that were so moving or so eloquent.'
37
At the same time, defense efforts to rebut such positive
testimony with "bad" victim evidence have been uniformly rebuffed
by the courts,138 despite the existence of the express right in many
131. See State v. Wessinger, 736 So. 2d 162, 183 (La. 1999); State v. Taylor, 669 So. 2d
364, 370-71 (La. 1996).
132. Conover v. State, 933 P.2d 904, 921 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997). According to the
Conover court, Payne "implicitly" overruled Booth's limit on sentence recommendations. See id.
at 920.
133. SeeWitter v. State, 921 P.2d 886, 896 (Nev. 1996).
134. See, e.g., State v. Deck, 994 S.W.2d 527, 538 (Mo. 1999) (en banc) (denying claim of
undue prejudice despite the fact that the VIE admitted reduced three jurors, and the vic-
tim's family, to tears in the courtroom).
135. See Gibeaut, supra note 96, at 43.
136. Sullivan v. State, 636 A.2d 931,940 (Del. 1994).
137. People v. Ratzke, 625 N.E.2d 1004, 1017 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); see also State v. Baston,
No. L-95-087, 1997 WL 570896, at *3, (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 12, 1997) (condemning lower
court's remark that, while denying undue influence of improper impact evidence, "'it is a
matter of special poignancy that... [defendant's] cold act of gratuitous violence ended the
life of a man of uncommon accomplishment, courage, enterprise, and decency. It is impor-
tant for reasons having nothing to do with legal analysis to note the panel's recognition of
that.' "), aff'd, 709 N.E.2d 128 (Ohio 1999).
138. See generally United States v. Beckford, 962 F. Supp. 804, 822 (E.D. Va. 1997)
("Payne cannot be read to sanction a defense argument that a defendant is undeserving of
the death penalty simply because his victim was a drug dealer."); State v. Southerland, 447
S.E.2d 862, 867 (S.C. 1994) (affirming preclusion of evidence relating to victim's involve-
ment in drugs and prostitution); State v. Hurley, 876 S.W.2d 57, 67 (Tenn. 1993)
(upholding denial of defendant's request to introduce evidence regarding decedent's solici-
tation of prostitute); Goff v. State, 931 S.W.2d 537, 556 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996) (upholding
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states to cross-examine impact witnesses.13 9 Morever, as the Payne
majority itself noted, given the high risk of offending jurors,
counsel are naturally loath to object to or challenge on cross-
examination such testimony.14° This reluctance is understandably
heightened with respect to witnesses' characterizations of the
emotional harms they have suffered, presuming such emotional
sentiments are capable of measure and, therefore, challenge. 14 As
a result, as noted by one commentator, a defendant's right to cross-
examine impact witnesses is "more apparent than real."
4 2
denial of defendant's request to introduce "reciprocal" character evidence, in this instance
that the victim was a "fag").
139. Georgia, for example, permits defendants to "cross-examine and rebut the evi-
dence presented of the victim's personal characteristics and the emotional impact of the
crime .... " GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-1.2(c) (1998). Georgia's courts, however, appear to be
less than favorably disposed to recognizing the right. See Barnes v. State, 496 S.E.2d 674, 689
(Ga. 1998) (barring admission of victim's "bad character" at sentencing); Hill v. State, 427
S.E.2d 770, 777 (Ga. 1993) (stating that the "general rule is that the character of the victim
is not relevant" at sentencing). Louisiana is another jurisdiction that expressly permits cross-
examination. See LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.2 (West 1997). However, capital de-
fendants there cannot proffer victim "lack of worth" evidence unless the State first puts on
evidence of the "victim's worth." State v. Cooks, 720 So. 2d 637, 645 n.6 (La. 1998).
It remains unclear whether capital defendants enjoy the constitutional right to cross-
examine in sentencing proceedings. Compare United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 406 (5th
Cir. 1998) (assuming without deciding that such a right exists), with Bassette v. Thompson,
915 F.2d 932, 939 (4th Cir. 1990) (concluding that no such right exists). The Supreme
Court has never directly addressed the question but has on occasion addressed closely re-
lated matters, with mixed results. See Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 161-62
(1994) (holding that due process requires that defendants be permitted to deny or chal-
lenge evidentiary bases for capital sentence); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 245-46
(1949) (rejecting the argument that due process precludes judicial use of unchallenged
material contained in presentence report).
140. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 823 (1991) (noting that for "tactical reasons
it might not be prudent for the defense to rebut victim impact evidence makes the case no
different than others in which a party is faced with this sort of dilemma"); see also Patrick M.
Fahey, Note, Payne v. Tennessee: An Eye for an Eye and Then Some, 25 CONN. L. REv. 205, 255
(1992) ("At capital sentencing, the jury has already convicted the offender of murdering the
victim. By attempting to impeach the testimony relating to the victim or impugn the victim's
character, the offender will only incense the jury."). This reticence, however, is usually not
reciprocated by the State, which typically predicates its penalty phase evidence on the
"deathworthiness" of the defendant. See, e.g., State v. Richardson, 923 S.W.2d 301, 320 (Mo.
1996) (en banc) ("The defendant's [bad] character is highly relevant to penalty phase de-
liberations.").
The situation is exacerbated by judicial reluctance to permit the use of continuing objec-
tions, which can otherwise serve to lessen the volume and intrusiveness of defense
objections. See United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1200 (10th Cir. 1998) (expressing
disfavor of continuing objections when evidentiary ruling depends on alleged prejudice);
People v. Dunlop, 975 P.2d 723, 745 (Colo. 1999) (same).
141. See Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 506 (1987) (noting that "rarely would
[defendants] be able to show that the family members have exaggerated the degree of sleep-
lessness, depression, or emotional trauma suffered").
142. Randall Coyne, Inflicting Payne on Oklahoma: The Use of Victim Impact Evidence During
the Sentencing Phase of Capital Cases, 45 OKLA. L. REv. 589, 599 (1992).
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Finally, critical questions remain over both the fundamental
purpose and role of VIE,1 43 a situation at palpable odds with the
Supreme Court's mandate that capital decisions be closely
guided,1 " and that capital jurors be instructed in more than "bare
terms" of how they are to evaluate the evidence."'5 The Supreme
Court of Missouri, for example, has advised unhelpfully that it "is
sufficient that ... [impact evidence] is relevant to inform the jury
as to the effect of the crime ... even if no instruction is given re-
garding the evidence." 4 6 Moreover, while all jurisdictions agree
that impact evidence is "relevant" and "shall" or "may" be
"considered," 47 and most reject that impact evidence should serve
as an aggravating circumstance 48 or*even a "superaggravator,"09 in
some jurisdictions impact evidence enjoys the status of a "non-
statutory" aggravating circumstance.' 50 In Florida, impact evidence
"is neither aggravating nor mitigating evidence. Rather, it is other
evidence, which is not required to be weighed against, or offset, by
statutory factors." 5 ' Other jurisdictions permit juror consideration
of impact evidence in support of already enumerated statutory ag-
gravators.5 2 To complicate matters further still, claims that juror
143. Consistent with the Court's hands-off approach to capital sentencing matters more
generally, the Payne majority specified only that impact evidence is "relevant to the jury's
decision as to whether or not the death penalty should be imposed." Payne, 501 U.S. at 827.
144. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976).
145. See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 653 (1990).
146. State v. Basile, 942 S.W.2d 342, 359 (Mo. 1997) (en banc).
147. See, e.g, 42 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 9711(c)(2) (West 1997) (stating that the jury "shall
consider" impact evidence); State v. Humphries, 479 S.E.2d 52, 56 (S.C. 1996) (stating that
"jury may consider" impact evidence).
148. See, e.g., State v. Gulbrandson, 906 P.2d 579, 599 (Ariz. 1995) (en banc); Noel v.
State, 960 S.W.2d 439, 445-46 (Ark. 1998); Windom v. State, 656 So. 2d 432, 438 (Fla. 1995);
State v. Basile, 942 S.W.2d 342, 359 (Mo. 1997); State v. Byram, 485 S.E.2d 360, 365 (S.C.
1997); Weeks v. Commonwealth, 450 S.E.2d 379, 389 (Va. 1994). The Tennessee Supreme
Court, faced with a prosecutor's invocation of impact evidence to "remind the jury to con-
sider the aggravating circumstances," instructed that this strategy was to be used "advisedly."
State v. Shepherd, 902 S.W.2d 895, 908 (Tenn. 1995).
149. See Douglas v. State, 951 P.2d 651, 675 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997).
150. See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(a) (1994); United States v. Thomas, 43 M.J. 550, 599 (C.A.A.F.
1995); Gattis v. State, 637 A.2d 808, 820 (Del. 1994); State v. Bucklew, 973 S.W.2d 83, 96
(Mo. 1998) (en banc).
151. State v. Maxwell, 647 So. 2d 871, 872 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994); see also Noel v.
State, 960 S.W.2d 439, 446 (Ark. 1998) ("[V]ictim impact evidence is not an additional ag-
gravating circumstance but rather is relevant evidence which informs the jury of the toll the
murder has taken on the victim's family."); State v. Humphries, 479 S.E.2d 52, 56 (S.C.
1996) ("[V]ictim impact evidence is neither an aggravating nor a mitigating circumstance,
but simply relevant evidence that the jury may consider in determining an appropriate pen-
alty.").
152. See, e.g., Pitsonbarger v. Gramley, 141 F.3d 728, 735 (7th Cir. 1998) (construing Il-
linois law); People v. Stanley, 897 P.2d 481, 523 (Cal. 1995); Lambert v. State, 675 N.E.2d
1060, 1064 (Ind. 1996); State v. Fisher, 445 S.E.2d 866, 874-75 (N.C. 1994).
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consideration of VIE amounts to "double-counting" of closely re-
lated aggravators have been rebuffed, 153 as have challenges based
on vagueness and overbreath.54
Nor has the impact of Payne been limited to the sentencing
phase, the only place that it would have plausible relevance under
Payne.155 The case law contains numerous instances of VIE being
introduced at the guilt phase, and the apparent receptivity of the
appellate courts has not discouraged the practice.'5 6 For instance,
in Bennett v. Angelone,15 7 the Fourth Circuit approved of the follow-
ing guilt-phase closing argument by a prosecutor:
Now, that's the Defendant sitting right over there. This is the
victim Anne Keller Vaden, attractive, intelligent, successful,
and dead. Who was she? Well, in 1975 she graduated from
Clover Hill High School as class valedictorian. Two years later
153. See United States v. Jones, 119 S. Ct. 2090, 2106-07 (1999) (denying claim that
non-statutory aggravators relating to victim impact evidence and victim "personal character-
istics" were impermissibly duplicative); United States v. Webster, 162 F.3d 308, 324 (5th Cir.
1998) (denying claim that non-statutory victim impact evidence and statutory aggravator
that murder was "especially heinous, cruel, and depraved" were impermissibly duplicative),
cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 83 (1999).
154. See Jones, 119 S. Ct. at 2107-10.
155. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 811 (1991) ("In this case we reconsider our
holdings in [Booth and Gathers], that the Eighth Amendment bars the admission of victim
impact evidence during the penalty phase of a capital trial."); see also State v. Keene, 693
N.E.2d 246, 260 (Ohio 1998) (stating that impact evidence is inadmissible in the sentencing
phase of capital proceeding); Powell v. State, 906 P.2d 765, 777 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995)
(same); Armstrong v. State, 826 P.2d 1106, 1116 (Wyo. 1992) (same).
156. See State v. Fautenberry, 650 N.E.2d 878, 882 (Ohio 1995) (stating that "evidence
which depicts both the circumstances surrounding the commission of the murder and also
the impact of the murder on the victim's family may be admissible during both the guilt and
sentencing phases"); see also, e.g., George v. Angelone, 100 F.3d 353, 359-60 (4th Cit. 1996)
(upholding prosecutor's guilt-phase argument relating to impact of murder on victim's
mother and father because it pertained to non-capital crimes charged); People v. Frye, 959
P.2d 183, 226 (Cal. 1998) (stating that "the challenged statements were made at the guilt
phase of trial, a stage of the proceedings that does not implicate the same considerations
regarding the deliberative role of the capital sentencing jury underlying the Court's decision
in Payne); Burns v. State, 609 So. 2d 600, 605-06 (Fla. 1992) (upholding impact testimony
at guilt phase by boss of victim regarding victim's character and background as a police
officer); Crawford v. State, 716 So. 2d 1028, 1046 (Miss. 1998) (holding that "evidence about
the characteristics of the victim is relevant to the crime charged"); Jenkins v. State, 607 So.
2d 1171, 1183 (Miss. 1992) (upholding admission of guilt stage evidence that the victim was
a mother, married for four years, and was reluctant to wear skirts because she was shy, con-
cluding that such evidence was "proper and necessary to a development of the case and true
characteristics of the victim").
The Fifth Circuit also recently signaled its uncertainty over limiting impact evidence to
sentencing. See Castillo v. Johnson, 141 F.3d 218, 224 (5th Cir.) (stating that Payne
"authorized states to allow victim impact evidence as a measure of harm to be admitted in
the guilt phase of a capital case"), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 979 (1998).
157. 92 F.3d 1336 (4th Cir. 1996), aftd, 522 U.S. 269 (1998).
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she married; she married Joey Vaden. In 1979, she went
to college, William and Mary, and had a 3.8 grade point
average-an intelligent girl. She was also a guest minister at
Tomahawk Church in Chesterfield-a guest minister.
I said she was successful. She had a type of real estate venture.
She was voted outstanding businesswoman of the year. She
finished second in the national oratory contest; that was Anne
Vaden.1 8
Characterizing the passage quoted above as "limited victim
background evidence," the Fourth Circuit concluded that it was
"not clear" that the prosecutor's remarks were improper.159 The
rationale for this judicial receptiveness was perhaps best expressed
by the Supreme Court of Alabama which, when discounting the
introduction of impact testimony at the guilt phase of one capital
trial, commented that "[i]t is presumed that jurors do not leave
their common sense at the court house door. It would elevate form
over substance ... [to reverse] simply because the jurors were told
what they probably already had suspected-that the victim was not
a 'human island,' but a unique individual. ' 60
III. THE EMERGENCE OF EXECUTION IMPACT EVIDENCE
As the preceding section makes clear, the past several years have
witnessed a dramatic shift in emphasis in capital jurisprudence.
With Parks, Brown, and Payne, the Supreme Court has at once
limited jurors' capacity to respond in an empathic way to already-
convicted capital defendants,16 ' and withdrawn all meaningful lim-
its on emotion and pathos with respect to their victims.'
6
Augmenting this shift, death penalty jurisdictions themselves have
158. Id. at 1348.
159. See id.
160. Ex payre Reiber, 663 So. 2d 999, 1006 (Ala. 1995). Otherwise, if not expressly ap-
proved of by the reviewing courts, the admission of guilt-phase impact evidence is commonly
regarded as non-prejudicial error. See, e.g., Pierson v. O'Leary, 959 F.2d 1385, 1391 (7th Cir.
1992) (finding harmless error and noting that "[e]very criminal case involving a victim will
create some sympathy"); Odle v. Calderon, 884 F. Supp. 1404, 1430 (N.D. Cal. 1995)
(finding harmless error because evidence introduced "early in the guilt phase"); Powell v.
State, 906 P.2d 765, 776-77 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (finding harmless error with extensive
guilt-phase impact evidence including reference to victim as a "good kid" and defendants as
"bad kids").
161. See supra notes 63-69 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 93-160 and accompanying text.
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greatly expanded the breadth of statutory aggravating factors capi-
tal jurors are to consider, lending further advantage to the State.'
In this changed landscape, capital defendants have struggled to
remain "individualized" before the jury. This section addresses one
such strategy: the proffer of "execution impact" evidence (EIE),
information presented to the sentencing authority from the friends
and loved ones of defendants that goes to the manifold conse-
quences attending the threatened execution.
At present, the admissibility of EIE is the subject of significant
disagreement among appellate courts, with most courts concluding
that defendants are not constitutionally entitled to have capital ju-
ries consider EIE. According to the narrow view adopted by these
courts, EIE is not "relevant" to the defendant's character, record or
the circumstances of the offense because it relates to a "third
party," that is, someone other than the defendant.TM Courts have
also rebuffed defense arguments that admission of VIE requires
reciprocal consideration of EIE, concluding that EIE is "not com-
parably relevant" to mitigate the specific harm of the murder or
defendant's blameworthiness in relation to it.165 Otherwise, these
courts summarily uphold preclusion of EIE on the rationale that it
is tantamount to an express recommendation of sentence, 6 6 a form
163. As recently noted by one commentator, the proliferation of statutory and non-
statutory aggravators, including victim impact evidence, and the increasingly lessened em-
phasis on mitigators, marks an evolution toward a "mandatory death penalty." SeeJeffrey L.
Kirchmeier, Aggravating and Mitigating Factors: The Paradox of Today's Arbitrary and Mandatory
Capital Punishment Scheme, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 345, 348 (1998). The author adds:
"[s]tates that permit the use of a broad range of non-statutory aggravating circumstances
and victim impact evidence.., thus increase the number of cases in which the sentencer is
likely to impose the death penalty." Id. at 396. For an incisive discussion of the powerful
legal-political interplay driving the proliferation of newly identified aggravators, see Jona-
than Simon & Christina Spaulding, Tokens of Our Esteem: Aggravating Factors in the Era of
Deregulated Death Penalties, in THE KILLING STATE: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN LAW, POLITICS
AND CULTURE 81-113 (Austin Sarat ed., 1999). According to the authors, "new aggravating
circumstances have been added to capital statutes, like Christmas tree ornaments. These
new factors reveal a process self-consciously freed from the dictates of substantive Supreme
Court review." Id. at 82.
164. See, e.g., People v. Armstrong, 700 N.E.2d 960, 971 (Ill. 1998); Simon v. State, 688
So. 2d 791, 811 (Miss. 1997); Turner v. State, 573 So. 2d 657, 667 (Miss. 1990); State v.
Loftin, 680 A.2d 677, 712-13 (N.J. 1996); State v. DiFrisco, 645 A.2d 734, 770 (N.J. 1994). In
Turner, defendant unsuccessfully sought to call (1) members of his family to testify to execu-
tion impact and (2) the family members of another, unrelated already-executed capital
defendant to testify about the impact the execution had on their lives. See Turner, 573 So. 2d
at 667.
165. See, e.g., Burns v. State, 699 So. 2d 646, 654 (Fla. 1997) ("We do not find merit in
this kind of quid pro quo assertion.... [EIE] is not similarly relevant or authorized."), cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 1063 (1998).
166. See, e.g., Burns, 699 So. 2d at 654; State v. Stenson, 940 P.2d 1239, 1281-82 (Wash.
1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1193 (1998); cf State v. Watson, Nos. CR.A. IN 91-09-0018 to
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of testimony that theoretically remains prohibited under Payne, ' or,
if admissible, deem its preclusion harmless because the trial court
permitted defendant to introduce other positive family-oriented evi-
dence thereby supposedly rendering EIE "cumulative.
"
'
However, numerous courts have acknowledged without qualm
the admission of EIE,169 tacitly signaled its admissibility, 170 or
specifically given mitigating weight to it.17' More importantly, the
Supreme Courts of California and Oregon have both expressly
approved of its consideration by capital juries. In the Oregon case,
State v. Stevens,17 2 the defendant was convicted of three counts of
aggravated murder, and defense counsel sought to cross-examine
defendant's wife as to the effects of the defendant's possible
execution on the couple's nine-year-old daughter. 7 3  Defense
counsel made separate offers of proof to establish the relevance of
CR.A. IN 91-09-0025, 1993 WL 603341, at *5 & n.4 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 19, 1993) (giving
mitigating weight to EIE but disregarding "opinion" evidence).
167. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 830 n.2 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 835 n.1 (Souter,J.,
concurring).
168. See, e.g., People v. Bacigalupo, 820 P.2d 559, 581 (Cal. 1991) (en banc); Loftin, 680
A.2d at 713; Stenson, 940 P.2d at 1282.
169. See State v. Noel, 960 S.W.2d 439, 446 (Ark. 1998) (noting that defendant's mother
testified and identified three childhood photos of defendant "which were offered into evi-
dence and which were clearly an effort to emphasize the loss that would be associated with
his execution"); State v. Simmons, 944 S.W.2d 165, 187 (Mo. 1997) (en banc) (noting use of
mitigating evidence designed to show that defendant's "death at the hands of the state
would injure his family," and closing argument to this effect); State v. Rhines, 548 N.W.2d
415, 446-47 (S.D. 1996) (noting that VIE was proper, on a reciprocal basis, given that de-
fendant's sisters had previously testified of "their love for him, and the negative effect his
death would have on their family"); State v. Benn, 845 P.2d 289, 316 (Wash. 1993) (en banc)
(noting evidence relating to "the affection of family members, and the loss to his loved ones
if he were sentenced to death").
170. See State v. Wessinger, 736 So. 2d 162, 192 (La. 1999) (rejecting claim that instruc-
tion failed to afford jurors "room" to consider the impact that the execution would have on
the defendant's family and friends).
171. See Richmond v. Ricketts, 640 F. Supp. 767, 792 (D. Ariz. 1986) (noting trial court's
consideration of testimony relating to "the impact of the execution" on family members),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Richmond v. Lewis, 506 U.S. 40, 52 (1992); State v. Mann, 934
P.2d 784, 795 (Ariz. 1997) (en banc) (noting mitigating evidence of defendant's
"relationship with his children and the effect on them if he were executed"); Lawrie v. State,
643 A.2d 1336, 1339 (Del. 1993) (noting that defendant's "execution would have 'a substan-
tially adverse impact' on his seven-year-old son ... and on [defendant's] mother"); State v.
Manley, Nos. 9511007022, 9511006992, 1997 WL 27094, at *13 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 10,
1997) (noting that the "death sentence would have a devastating impact upon [defendant's]
family"); Watson, 1993 WL 603341, at *5 (noting that "the defendant is a member of the
victim's family and his execution would further traumatize that family"); Barnes v. State, 496
S.E.2d 674, 687-89 (Ga. 1998) (reversing death sentence because inter alia the trial court
refused to admit photos of defendant's daughter and nephew intended to "show the jury
that a death sentence would impact the children in his life").
172. 879 P.2d 162 (Or. 1994).
173. See id. at 163. On direct examination by the State, defendant's wife testified that
defendant had abused both her and her daughter. See id.
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the evidence, eliciting that (1) the execution would be "destructive
to her" in an "emotional" sense in that she "would feel responsible
somehow"; (2) it "would not be good for her... I mean, she knows
he's going to be in there the rest of his life, and that's you know,
that's a better story than they killed him"; (3) "it's just not going to
be good for her at all... [s]he'll never hug him"; and (4) "[h]e is
her father."74 The trial court sustained the State's objection,
concluding that the testimony was "irrelevant" to the "defendant's
background and character."'75
Citing the Lockett mandate for unfettered consideration of po-
tentially mitigating circumstances, the Oregon Supreme Court
reversed.76 According to the Stevens court, just as "testimony by
loved ones ... says something about the character of the [murder]
victim" under Payne, "testimony by the relatives of a capital defen-
dant may be informative about certain aspects of the defendant's
character."'77 Although not constituting "direct evidence about de-
fendant's character or background," EIE can constitute valuable
"circumstantial evidence":
A rational juror could infer from the witness's testimony that
she believed that her daughter would be affected adversely by
defendant's execution because of something positive about
his relationship with his daughter and because of something
positive about defendant's character or background. Put dif-
ferently, a rational juror could infer that there are positive
aspects about defendant's relationship with his daughter that
demonstrate that defendant has the capacity to be of emo-
tional value to others. In that inference, a juror could find an
aspect of defendant's character or background that could jus-
tify a sentence less than death.
78
Even more recently, in People v. Ochoa,179 the California Supreme
Court expressly approved of EIE. The narrow question before the
Court in Ochoa was whether a capital defendant's due process
rights were violated when the jury was instructed that it was permis-
sible to have feelings of sympathy for the defendant with respect to
the possibly impending execution, yet not his family. The Ochoa
court squarely rejected the assertion that sympathy for defendant's
174. Id. at 163-64.
175. Seeid. at 165.
176. Id. at 168.
177. Id. at 167.
178. Id. at 168.
179. 966 P.2d 442 (Cal. 1998).
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family was an appropriate consideration, but in a highly nuanced
analysis was at pains to articulate its approval of EIE.'5 ° According
to the court, "[a] defendant may offer evidence that he or she is
loved by family members or others, and that these individuals want
him or her to live. [This] evidence is relevant because it constitutes
indirect evidence of the defendant's character." 81 The court pro-
ceeded to state that "sympathy for a defendant's family is not a
matter that a capital jury can consider in mitigation, but.., family
members may offer testimony of the impact of an execution on
them if by so doing they illuminate some positive quality of the de-
fendant's background or character."
2
In sum, the case law evinces a marked ambivalence relative to
EIE.18 3 This judicial reluctance is curious for several reasons. Most
fundamentally, exclusion is inconsistent with the basic recognition
that EIE, as noted by the Oregon and California Supreme Courts,
powerfully conveys the quality, depth, and range of emotional at-
tachments enjoyed by capital defendants, mitigating evidence
universally deemed highly relevant to death decisions,'84 and oth-
erwise embraced by the same courts that reject EIE.5 5 The
exclusion is also curious because EIE is largely indistinguishable
180. See id. at 505-06. The court noted that several years before it had "surmised that
'defendant may have a constitutional right to present evidence of the effect of a death ver-
dict on his family .... .'" Id. at 505 (quoting People v. Cooper, 53 Cal. 3d 771, 844 (1991)).
In fact, the Ochoa court's assessment is an understatement of the court's previous ambiva-
lence on the issue. See People v. Jones, 931 P.2d 960, 1003-04 (Cal.) ("Neither the [U.S.
Supreme Court] nor this court yet has decided whether the jury may consider evidence of
the impact ajudgment of death would have upon the defendant's family."), cert. denied, 522
U.S. 955 (1997); People v. Fierro, 821 P.2d 1302, 1336 (Cal. 1991) (en banc) ("assuming
without deciding that defendant has a right to introduce evidence of the effect of a death
sentence on his family," but stating that right not violated because EIE admitted); People v.
Bacigalupo, 820 P.2d 559, 581 (Cal. 1991) ("Assuming that testimony of a death judgment's
impact on the defendant's family is relevant mitigating evidence," but finding that error
would be cumulative because defendant's mother "begged the jury to spare defendant's
life.").
181. Ochoa, 966 P.2d at 505-06.
182. Id. at 506. The court added by way of example that "a jury may take into account
testimony from the defendant's mother that she loves her son if it believes that he must
possess [some] redeeming qualities to have earned his mother's love." Id.
183. Like California until Ochoa, Washington case law highlights some confusion. In
State v. Benn, 845 P.2d 289, 316 (Wash. 1993) (en banc), the Washington Supreme Court
expressly considered, but found insufficient, mitigating evidence of "the affection of family
members, and the loss to [defendant's] loved ones if he were sentenced to death." More
recently, however, in State v. Stenson, 940 P.2d 1239, 1282 (Wash. 1997) (en banc), the court
upheld a trial court's exclusion of EIE, reasoning that it amounted to "nothing more than
[family members'] opinions as to the sentence for the Defendant that they thought might
be best for the Stenson children."
184. See supra notes 172-82 and accompanying text.
185. See, e.g., Burns v. State, 699 So. 2d 646, 654 (Fla. 1997); State v. Loftin, 680 A.2d
677, 712-13 (N.J. 1996); Stenson, 940 P.2d at 1282.
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from defense witnesses' "pleas for mercy" that are commonly per-
mitted in capital sentencings, 1 6 and the common law right of
allocution recognized in many jurisdictions whereby defendants
themselves request that their lives be spared.187 Reading the opin-
ions of courts barring EIE, one is compelled to ask, as one
dissenting New Jersey Supreme Court Justice did, "[w] hy is the
Court afraid of giving the defendant the opportunity to establish
whether or not such mitigating evidence exists?"08 8 The obvious an-
186. See, e.g., People v. Hines, 938 P.2d 388, 406 (Cal. 1997) (noting that aunt
.expressed her love for defendant, and asked the jury not to sentence him to death"); Bar-
nes v. State, 496 S.E.2d 674, 688 (Ga. 1998) (finding it "reversible error to prevent a friend
or relative of the defendant from taking the stand and pleading with the jury for mercy");
Cofield v. State, 274 S.E.2d 530, 542 (Ga. 1981) (stating that it is "unwilling to foreclose a
defendant seeking to avoid the imposition of the death penalty from appealing to the mercy
of the jury by having his parents testify briefly to their love for him. The state frequently uses
members of the victim's family for no different purpose."); State v. Simmons, 944 S.W.2d
165, 189 (Mo. 1997) (en banc) (noting mother's plea for mercy as mitigation strategy); State
v. DiFrisco, 645 A.2d 734, 772 (N.J. 1994) (noting trial court's decision to permit mother of
defendant, but not his siblings, to plead for mercy and adding that it "may not agree" with
preclusion of the siblings' testimony); State v. Woodard, 623 N.E.2d 75, 82 (Ohio 1993)
(noting that defendant's mother and sister testified that "they love appellant, and both re-
quested that [he] be spared the death penalty," but assigning testimony "little or no weight
in mitigation"); State v. Torrence, 406 S.E.2d 315, 318 (S.C. 1991) (noting a "defendant may
present witnesses who know and care for him and are willing on that basis to ask for mercy
on his behalf. . . ."); see also Acker & Lanier, supra note 39, at 308-09 (noting that "even the
most unforgiving statutes inevitably are tempered by mercy in application.... Even if it were
possible to exclude mercy from capital sentencing hearings statutorily, it would be impru-
dent to do so.").
187. See, e.g., Homick v. State, 825 P.2d 600, 604 (Nev. 1992) (holding that "capital de-
fendants in the State of Nevada enjoy the common law right of allocution [before the
jury]"); DiFrisco, 645 A.2d at 757 ("[T]he purpose of allocution is two-fold. First, it reflects
our commonly-held belief that our civilization should afford every defendant an opportunity
to ask for mercy. Second, it permits a defendant to impress ajury with his or her feelings of
remorse."); State v. Lord, 822 P.2d 177, 216 (Wash. 1991) (upholding right of defendant to
make unsworn plea for mercy to jury); see also J. Thomas Sullivan, The Capital Defendant's
Right to Make a Personal Plea for Mercy: Common Law Allocution and Constitutional Mitigation, 15
N.M. L. REv. 41 (1985); Caren Myers, Note, Encouraging Allocution at Capital Sentencing: A
Proposalfor Use Immunity, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 787 (1997).
At least three federal circuits have held that violation of the federal statutory right to allo-
cute, embodied in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32, is not subject to "harmless error"
review. See United States v. Myers, 150 F.3d 459, 464 (5th Cir. 1998); United States v. Patter-
son, 128 F.3d 1259, 1261 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v. De Alba Pagan, 33 F.3d 125, 129
(lst Cir. 1994).
Interestingly, in New Jersey, a study group assembled to re-examine death penalty proce-
dures recently recommended that the unsworn allocution statements of capital defendants
must be presented in the same highly structured, unemotional manner required of the State
when presenting VIE. See GOVERNOR'S STUDY COMMISSION ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
DEATH PENALTY-FINAL REPORT 25 (Aug. 6, 1998) (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform) [hereinafter Governor's Study].
188. State v. Marshall, 690 A.2d 1, 121 (N.J. 1997) (Handler, J., dissenting)
(condemning majority's rejection of EIE based on concern for "'clear risk of an adverse jury
reaction' ").
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swer lies in the powerful emotional quality of EIE and the impor-
tant information it conveys.
IV. WHY EIE SHOULD BE PERMITTED IN CAPITAL TRIALS
The present climate in which capital defendants are required to
litigate makes judicial refusal to permit EIE not only paradoxical
but also fundamentally unfair and contrary to the Eighth and Four-
teenth Amendments. This section advances two fundamental
arguments in support of the admission of EIE, one constitutional
and the other based on concerns sounding in fundamental fair-
ness.
A. Capital Defendants' Unfettered Constitutional
Right to Proffer Relevant Mitigating Evidence
Since the death penalty was reinstituted in 1976 with the Court's
decision in Gregg v. Georgia, 189 the predominant goal of capital sen-
tencing has been to facilitate jurors' identification of who is
"deathworthy," based on a "reasoned moral response" to the de-
fendant's background, character, and crime.1 90 Notwithstanding
the Court's recent move toward broadening the individualization
mandate,' 9' this goal has been not just the distinctive but also the
redeeming constitutional characteristic of death penalty proce-
dural law. 92 The Constitution requires that "'the sentencer ... not
be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of
189. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
190. See supra notes 21-41 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 6-14 and accompanying text.
192. See Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 275 (1998) (noting that the Court has
"emphasized the need for a broad inquiry into all relevant mitigating evidence to allow an
individualized determination"); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 649 (1990) (noting that
"the Court has refused to countenance state-imposed restrictions on what mitigating circum-
stances may be considered in deciding whether to impose the death penalty"); Woodson v.
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (characterizing "individualized sentencing deter-
minations" as a "constitutionally indispensable part" of any capital sentencing scheme);
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 271 (1976) (stating that "in order to meet the requirement of
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, a capital-sentencing system must allow the sen-
tencing authority to consider mitigating circumstances"); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189-90 n.38
(stating that it is "constitutionally required that the sentencing authority have information
sufficient to enable it to consider the character and individual circumstances of a defendant
prior to imposition of a death sentence").
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a defendant's character or record ... that the defendant proffers
as a basis for a sentence less than death.' 093
Judicial preclusion of EIE, however, contravenes this constitu-
tional mandate. It at once places beyond jurors' reach possibly
mitigating evidence that they can put to use in their "reasoned
moral response," in defiance of the precept that "'a State may not
cut off in an absolute manner the presentation of mitigating evi-
dence....""' As accurately noted by both the Oregon and
California Supreme Courts, 5 EIE is relevant because it can dem-
onstrate in an emotionally compelling fashion the character traits
and essential human worth of defendants. EIE shows, as the Ore-
gon Supreme Court stated, "that defendant has the capacity to be
of emotional value to others. In that inference, a juror could find
an aspect of defendant's character or background that could justify
a sentence of less than death." 96 EIE, as observed by New Jersey
Supreme Court Justice Alan Handler, "evinces the strength of the
bond between the victim and his or her family. The contribution
and connection the victim or defendant makes to his or her family
is thus indicative of his or her character and relevant in mitiga-
193. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110 (1982) (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S.
586, 604 (1978)); accord Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 398-99 (1987); Skipper v. South
Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4 (1986).
This goal is advanced by the virtual suspension at the penalty phase of otherwise applica-
ble restrictive evidentiary rules. See Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 97 (1979) (per curiam)
(noting state evidentiary rules cannot be used to limit admission of reliable mitigating evi-
dence); United States v. Frank, 8 F. Supp. 2d 253, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) ("That the federal
rules of evidence are suspended during a capital sentencing hearing is particularly appro-
priate given the difference of death from all other penalties."); Romine v. State, 305 S.E.2d
93, 101 (Ga. 1983) ("This court ... has consistently refused to place unnecessary restrictions
on the evidence that can be offered in mitigation at the sentencing phase of a death penalty
case."). See generally Robert A. Kelly, Applicability of the Rules of Evidence to the Capital Sentencing
Proceeding. Theoretical and Practical Support for Open Admissibility of Mitigating Information, 60
UMKC L. REv. 411 (1992) (discussing prevalent relaxation of evidentiary rules in capital
sentencing).
194. Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 361 (1993) (citation omitted). Ironically, the Payne
Court echoed this same sentiment: "'States cannot limit the sentencer's consideration of any
relevant circumstance that could cause it to decline to impose the penalty. In this respect,
the State cannot challenge the sentencer's discretion, but must allow it to consider any rele-
vant information offered by the defendant.'" Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 824 (1991)
(quoting McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 305-06 (1987)); see also Hitchcock v. Dugger,
481 U.S. 393, 398-99 (1987) (stating that the inclusiveness mandate applies to statutory and
non-statutory mitigating evidence alike).
195. See supra notes 172-82 and accompanying text.
196. State v. Stevens, 879 P.2d 162, 168 (Or. 1994). The Stevens Court also noted that to
the extent EIE indicates to the sentencer that "defendant can be of emotional value to oth-
ers," it also serves to highlight the continued human value he might have for others, even in
a prison setting. See id. at 167-68 (citing Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 5-7 (1986)
(holding that "defendant's disposition to make a well-behaved and peaceful adjustment to
life in prison" is mitigating)).
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tion." 97 Dissenting from his colleagues' preclusion of EIE, Justice
Handler added:
The effect that defendant had on his children, as evidenced
by the impact of his execution, is relevant because ... it dem-
onstrates defendant's ability to have an emotional impact on
others and positively to engage and influence another human
life. It demonstrates defendant's human worth at the moment
that the jury is to decide life or death .... [EIE] is clearly as
relevant to defendant's character as the fact that he attended
Bucks County Community College.198
In short, it is constitutionally unacceptable to preclude EIE
because it is "irrelevant"' or, paradoxically, "cumulative."200 Capital
defendants must be permitted to proffer evidence relating to, and
ask that full mitigating consideration be accorded, the impact their
possible execution would have.20 ' This constitutional imperative is
augmented by what we know about the pitfalls of capital jury
decision making. A solid body of research now shows that capital
juries frequently misunderstand or ignore instructions on
mitigating evidence,2 2 tend to regard the "default" sentence to be
197. State v. Loftin, 680 A.2d 677, 745 (N.J. 1996) (Handler, J., dissenting).
198. Id. at 746.
199. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
200. See supra note 168 and accompanying text. The use of cumulativeness as a basis for
exclusion in death penalty cases, in particular, has been expressly questioned by the Su-
preme Court. In Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986), the Court dismissed the State's
argument that proffered evidence of defendant's good behavior in jail was "merely cumula-
tive" because "it appear[ed] reasonably likely that the exclusion ... may have affected the
jury's decision to impose the death sentence [and] [tihus, under any standard, the exclu-
sion of the evidence was sufficiently prejudicial to constitute reversible error." Id. at 7-8.
According to the Skipper Court, "[t] he exclusion by the state trial court of relevant mitigating
evidence impeded the sentencing jury's ability to carry out its task of considering all relevant
facets of the character and record of the individual offender." Id.
201. Cf Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989) ("[lit is not enough simply to allow
the defendant to present mitigating evidence to the sentencer.").
202. See Shari S. Diamond & Judith N Levi, Improving Decisions on Death by Revising and
Testing Jury Instructions, 79 JUDICATURE 224, 231 (1996) (finding that jurors were 18% less
likely to impose death if provided clarified instructions); Craig Haney, Taking Capital Jurors
Seriously, 70 IND. LJ. 1223, 1229 (1995) (reporting that less than 50% of interview subjects
"could provide even a partially correct definition for the term 'mitigation' "); James Lugin-
buhl & Julie Howe, Discretion in Capital Sentencing Instructions: Guided or Misguided?, 70 IND.
L.J. 1161, 1165-67 (1995) (finding that roughly half of jurors interviewed mistakenly be-
lieved that they could rely on any aggravator and that mitigators could be relied upon only if
jurors unanimously agreed beyond a reasonable doubt). See generally WELSH S. WHITE, THE
DEATH PENALTY IN THE EIGHTIES: AN EXAMINATION OF THE MODERN SYSTEM OF CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT 69 (1987) (observing thatjurors are "torn between rendering a moral decision
and applying a legal formula they don't quite understand"); Howarth, supra note 12, at 1376
(reporting that "juror after juror [stated] that the judge's instructions required them to
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death, and frequently have predetermined the appropriate
punishment before the penalty phase even begins, manifesting a
marked "death tilt."2 4 Combined with the systemic tendency to
undervalue not just mitigating evidence, but non-statutory
mitigating evidence (such as defendant "character" evidence) in
particular,2 5 and the practical impossibility of assessing legal
prejudice when such information is excluded,0 6 these realities
make admission of EIE all the more constitutionally necessary.
impose death"); cf. Deck v. Missouri, 994 S.W. 527, 541-42 (Mo.) (upholding trial court's
refusal to elucidate meaning of "mitigation," despite two requests by jury in death delibera-
tion), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 508 (1999).
203. See William J. Bowers & Benjamin D. Steiner, Death By Default: An Empirical Demon-
stration of False and Forced Choices in Capital Sentencing, 77 TEX. L. REV. 605, 630 (1999)
(finding that lack of instructions on alternatives to death leads jurors to "vote for death by
default"); id. at 716 (noting "a kind of hegemonic myth of early release that infects the capi-
tal sentencing decision with excessiveness"); Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Deadly
Confusion: Juror Instructions in Capital Cases, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 12 (1993) (finding that
"indecision tends to be resolved in favor of death", and that "Itihe default sentence in a
capital case is death").
204. See, e.g., William J. Bowers et al., Foreclosed Impartiality in Capital Sentencing: Jurors'
Predispositions, Guilt-trial Experience, and Premature Decision Making, 83 CORNELL L. Rv. 1476,
1488-90 (1998) (noting that 48% of 864 capital jurors prematurely reached a penalty deci-
sion at the guilt stage, with 28.6% selecting death); Luginbuhl & Howe, supra note 202, at
1177 (noting that "even before hearing the instructions, the jury is predisposed toward a
verdict of death."); Marla Sandys, Cross-Overs-Capital Jurors Who Change Their Minds About
Punishment: A Litmus Test for Sentencing Guidelines, 70 IND. L.J. 1183, 1220 (1995) (stating that
"[tihe data reveal quite dramatically that ... the majority of jurors reach their decisions
about guilt and punishment at the same time").
205. See, e.g., State v. Wacaser, 794 S.W.2d 190, 195 (Mo. 1990) (upholding lower court's
refusal to specify non-statutory mitigating circumstances in jury instructions); State v.
Bishop, 472 S.E.2d 842, 859 (N.C. 1996) (upholding rejection of requested non-statutory
mitigator that "defendant's family loves and cares about the defendant," reasoning that trial
court had instructed on "catchall circumstance" that no juror found to exist). See generally
Acker & Lanier, supra note 39, at 337-39 (noting that only four states specify in their "catch-
all" factors evidence identified in Lockett as mitigating: character, record, and offense charac-
teristics).
Unfortunately, the Court's recent holdings in the area of mitigation do not promise to
remedy this undervaluation. In Walton, for example, the Court upheld a statutory regime
that limited juror consideration of mitigating evidence to that meeting a preponderance of
the evidence standard, a burden borne by the defendant. See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S.
639, 649-51 (1990). In Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269 (1998), the Court held that capi-
tal jurors need not be instructed on the concept of mitigation, or particular statutorily
specified mitigating factors.
206. See Craig Haney, The Social Context of Capital Murder: Social Histories and the Logic of
Mitigation, 35 SANTA CLARA L. RaV. 547, 606 (1994-95) (discussing inherent difficulties in
"[e]stimating the effect that mitigating evidence would have had on a reasonable juror").
Because exclusion of potentially mitigating evidence undermines the reliability of sentenc-
ing determinations, it should be deemed an error of constitutional magnitude as to which
the State must establish harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt. See Satterwhite v. Texas,
486 U.S. 249, 258 (1988).
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B. Considerations of Fundamental Fairness
Even assuming that the Lockett individualization mandate does
not require admission of EIE for core constitutional reasons, basic
fairness compels that EIE be admitted. The changes wrought by
the Court's recent capital decisions, most especially Payne, Parks,
and Brown, and the strategic realities and high-pitched emotional
dynamic of modem capital trials, make juror consideration of ElE
imperative.
1. Redressing the Emotional Imbalance Created by Payne, Parks, and
Brown-To the Payne majority, the combination of Lockett's man-
date allowing virtually unfettered mitigating evidence in favor of
defendants, coupled with Booth's prohibition of VIE, "unfairly
weighted the scales in a capital trial."2 °7 The victim's "voice," other-
wise silenced by the defendant's murderous act,20 8 was needed to
"'keep the balance true.'209
While the existence of this need itself is questionable in both
constitutional210 and emotional21' terms, the reality is that Payne did
more than merely "true" the perceived imbalance between
offenders and their victims. 212 This is because VIE is not, as the
207. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808,822 (1991).
208. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 825 (quoting Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 517 (1987)
(White, J., dissenting) (stating that VIE " ' remind[s] the sentencer that just as the murderer
should be considered as an individual, so too the victim ... represents a unique loss to soci-
ety and in particular to his family'").
209. Id. at 827 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 122 (1934) (Cardozo,J.)).
"True" is defined as "[t]o position (something) so as to make it balanced, level, or square."
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1919 (3d ed. 1992).
210. See sources cited supra note 11 (expressing doubt that the constitutional framework
is designed to ensure that the State be able to present its case in a manner "level" to that of
the accused).
211. Justice Stevens, in his Payne dissent, cast a jaundiced eye toward this purported
emotional imbalance, making several observations. First, the defendant has just been con-
victed of murder (hardly an enviable strategic position); second, the State is always
empowered to rebut any mitigating evidence offered by the defense; and third, the State is
also always free to "designate any relevant conduct to be an aggravating factor" consistent
with the law. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 860 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
Moreover, given the typically gruesome facts of the killing, images of the victim naturally
are foremost in jurors' minds, further lessening the emotional need for VIE. See generally
Markus Dirk Dubber, The Right to Be Punished: Autonomy and Its Demise in Modern Penal
Thought, 16 LAw & HIST. REv. 113, 144 (1998) ("Today, the gap between judge and judged,
between the subject and the object of criminal punishment, runs deep and wide.... Em-
pathic identification is limited to victims and considered beyond the pale for violent
offenders.").
212. Payne's lament of imbalance has enduring origins in conservative thought. See
Abraham S. Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69
YALE L.J. 1149, 1151 (1960) (surveying views of those condemning the existence of a
"serious imbalance," includingJudge Learned Hand in the 1920s). What is new about Payne,
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Payne majority blithely reassured, "simply another form or method"
of imparting information to the sentencer. 15 Rather, it is the
singularly most compelling type of evidence available to the State:
invariably positive, highly emotional testimony, coming directly
from the hearts and mouths of those left behind,214 and imbued
with the imprimatur of the State.215 The power of VIE derives from
its capacity to at once encourage "empathetic concern for the
victim and the victim's survivors,"216 and distract jurors from their
"empathy obligation," specifically, to "find the good in the
offender's character., 21 1 On a deeper yet still more psychological
level, as Susan Bandes has written, VIE evokes "a complex set of
emotions directed toward the defendant, including hatred, fear,
racial animus, vindictiveness, undifferentiated vengeance, and the
desire to purge collective anger., 21 And the potent evidence comes
when the emotional dynamic in a capital trial is at its most delicate,
the actual death decision, with very little if any guidance provided
however, is its clear concern for the "voice" of the victim-as opposed to the generic inter-
ests of the State--in criminal prosecutions. Indeed, Payne represents a cornerstone of a
potent national movement which, although originally dedicated to ensuring victim
"participation" in criminal trials (mainly through the right to be present, informed, and
heard at critical junctures), now aggressively seeks to advantage the prosecution. See Robert
P. Mosteller, Victims'Rights and the Constitution: Moving from Guaranteeing Participatory Rights to
Benefiting the Prosecution, 29 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1053 (1998).
Also it bears mention, as one commentator has noted, that the Payne majority's use ofJus-
tice Cardozo's "balance true" statement was not altogether consistent with its original
meaning and intent. See Dubber, Tender Heart, supra note 17, at 156 n.181 (stating that "[a]
closer look at the quoted passage reveals that Justice Cardozo did not even speak of a bal-
ance of defendants' rights and victims' rights").
213. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 825; id. at 827 ("There is no reason to treat [impact] evi-
dence differently than other relevant evidence is treated.").
214. See supra notes 93-127 and accompanying text. Writing shortly after Payne was
handed down, one commentator observed that
[t]he Court now apparently believes that the ability of a defendant to avoid death
should be equated with the ability of the prosecutor to prove the value of the de-
ceased's life.... The worth of the deceased will invariably be shown to be more
valuable than the life of the killer. This inflammatory proof unfairly increases the
likelihood of execution.
Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PiTT. L. REV. 393, 423 (1992).
215. See Paul Gewirtz, Victims and Voyeurs at the Criminal Trial 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 863, 880
(1996) (noting that "[VIE] has the imprimatur of the 'state' as author and therefore argua-
bly gains narrative authority").
216. Id. at 873.
217. Samuel H. Pillsbury, EmotionalJustice: Moralizing the Passions of Criminal Punishment,
74 CORNELL L. REv. 655, 694 (1989).
218. Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. CHI. L. REv.
361, 395 (1996).
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on how jurors are to weigh such powerful testimony in their
visceral "reasoned moral response." 19
The proliferation of VIE, and the numbing emotional effect of
Parks and Brown, demand reciprocal use of an emotional
counterweight in the form of EIE.220 Even before Payne, Parks, and
Brown, it was widely recognized that prosecutors enjoy a notable
persuasive edge in convincing jurors to vote in favor of death. 2 In
their wake, the State's already prodigious advantage has increased
immeasurably, a position that only promises to be enhanced with
the proliferation of aggressive victims' rights initiatives. 22 Depriving
capital defendants of EIE robs them of an essential emotional tool
as they endeavor to humanize themselves in the eyes of (the
already "death-qualified") jurors,223 an enormously difficult quest
given the recognized "death-tilt" of capital jurors,224 and the natural
revulsion they have for the individual they have just convicted of
capital murder.2 2 5 EIE has a unique capacity to counter the
219. See supra notes 143-54 and accompanying text.
220. This reciprocity between VIE and EIE was recently acknowledged by the South Da-
kota Supreme Court which, when faced with the question of whether particular VIE was
admissible, ultimately justified its inclusion on the basis that defendant's sisters had previ-
ously testified of "their love for him, and the negative effect his death would have on their
family." State v. Rhines, 548 N.W.2d 415, 446 (S.D. 1996); cf Governor's Study, supra note 187
(describing recommendation of New Jersey death penalty commission that capital defen-
dants' allocution statements be required to assume identical, highly structured form as
required of VIE).
221. See Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MIcH. L. REv. 1574, 1590 (1987)
("While the defense will seek to have the jury empathize with the defendant, the defense
narrative ... is a difficult one to convey, and the [State's] legalistic formula can provide
sanctuary from moral anxiety."); Pillsbury, supra note 217, at 697 ("[T]he prosecution [has]
a significant advantage at the punishment stage. The law's sanction of retribution, and the
fact of criminal conviction, give weight and legitimacy to the prosecution's angry appeal.");
Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice,
44 VAND. L. RV. 45, 59 (1991) ("[T]he prosecutor benefits from unique prestige and sym-
bolic power. Because she represents the community, she commonly carries more influence
with juries.... The prosecutor can rely on jurors' natural instincts to be protected against
crime.").
222. See Mosteller, supra note 212, at 1055-57, 1062-64 (describing existing and pro-
posed constitutional enactments at the state and federal level "aggressively" geared toward
ensuring increased victim involvement).
223. A considerable body of empirical research establishes that such jurors are more
prone to vote for death. See Ronald C. Dillehay & Maria R. Sandys, Life Under Wainwright v.
Witt: Juror Dispositions and Death Qualification, 20 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 147, 156-64 (1996);
Jane Goodman-Delahunty et al., Construing Motive in Videotaped Killings: The Role of Jurors'
Attitudes Toward the Death Penalty, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 257, 269 (1998);James Luginbuhl
& Kathi Middendorf, Death Penalty Beliefs and Jurors Responses to Aggravating and Mitigating
Circumstances in Capital Trials, 12 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 263, 275 (1988).
224. See supra notes 202-04.
225. See Craig Haney, Violence and the Capital Jury: Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement and
the Impulse to Condemn to Death, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1447, 1469 (1997) (observing that "most
capital juries will be terribly frightened of defendants, and provoked to punitive and
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"otherness" of capital defendants, 12 6 whose social and economic
backgrounds (and violent criminality) can make them profoundly
"different" to most jurors.27 Love for and appreciation of the
defendant's human qualities, which EIE can powerfully convey, not
only qualifies as "familiar" but in all likelihood also has great moral
resonance with most jurors.2
In sum, despite the Supreme Court's ambivalent stance on the
role of "emotion" in capital trials,2 the inescapable reality is that
vengeful feelings, long before they are exposed to any other information about them");
Steven J. Sherman, The Capital Juty Project: The Role of Responsibility and How Psychology Can
Inform the Law, 70 IND. L.J. 1241, 1244 (1995) ("To the extent that the prosecution can point
to the evilness of the defendant, jurors can diminish their own sense of responsibility, and
blame the murderer for his own execution."); cf Dan M. Kahan, The Anatomy of Disgust in
Criminal Law, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1621, 1646 (1998) (noting that "constraining disgust is the
role that we assign to mercy in capital sentencing").
226. See Gary Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty
Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 299, 335 (1983) (characterizing the effort to "portray the defendant
as a human being" as the primary goal of the defense at sentencing); Robert Weisberg, De-
regulating Death, 1983 Sup. CT. REv. 305, 361 ("The overall goal of the defense is to present a
human narrative ... so the jury will be less inclined to cast [the defendant] out of the hu-
man circle."); see also Christopher J. Meade, Note, Reading Death Sentences: The Narrative
Construction of Capital Punishment, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 732, 758 (1996) ("If the defendant is
portrayed as a full human being, with a personality that does not fit within the 'murderer'
stereotype.... even if [the juror] believes that murderers in general should be executed,
she may very well feel that this particular defendant should be spared.").
227. See 1 JAMES F. STEPHEN, A HIsToRY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 478 (1883)
(analogizing the execution of detested criminals to the extermination of dangerous ani-
mals); Alan M. Dershowitz, The Last Resort, in A PUNISHMENT IN SEARCH OF A CRIME 329, 331
(Ian Gray & Moira Stanley eds., 1989) ("Legal rules do not determine who gets executed...
We value the life most of those who we are most alike."); Haney, supra note 225, at 1451-55
(describing the capital process as a "mechanism of moral disengagement," a system that
"dehumanizes" capital defendants, and serves to perpetuate stereotypes and distance capital
jurors from the fundamentally moral decision they must make).
228. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 520 n.17 (1968) (citation omitted)
(suggesting that those who categorically oppose the death penalty reflect "the shuddering
recognition of a kinship" with the accused).
229. See Gewirtz, supra note 215, at 877-78 (recounting how both liberal and conserva-
tive members of the Court have equivocated on the issue). Indeed, Justice O'Connor's
position is especially instructive. In Payne, she readily acknowledged that jurors were likely
"moved," but condoned the emotional response because the victim impact evidence "did
not inflame their passions more than did the facts of the crime." Payne v. Tennessee, 501
U.S. 808, 832 (1991) (O'ConnorJ., concurring). This assessment, however, markedly differs
from Justice O'Connor's unequivocal view in Brown that capital decisions must be a
"reasoned moral response" not an "emotional response." California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 539,
545 (1987); cf Winston v. United States, 172 U.S. 303, 313 (1899) (holding that "[h]ow far
considerations of ... sympathy ... should be allowed weight ... is committed ... to the
sound discretion of the jury, and of the jury alone").
The appropriateness of the role of emotion in sentencing has become the focus of bur-
geoning scholarly interest. See, e.g., Bandes, supra note 218, at 368 ("Emotion and cognition,
to the extent they are separable, act in concert to shape our perceptions and reactions....
[E]motion leads to truer perception and, ultimately, to better (more accurate, more moral,
more just) decisions."); Paul Gewirtz, On "I Know It When I See It," 105 YALE L.J. 1023, 1029
(1996) (condemning an "overly narrow concept of reason and contrasting reason and emo-
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Payne has placed emotion front and center in capital trials,
embroiling jurors in an emotional tug-of-war between the State and
the capital defendant.230 In this struggle, as Joan Howarth has
noted, "emotion is everywhere," and deeply felt by the juror-
231participants. Just as Payne deems it insufficient to simply presume
that a victim's loved ones suffer hardships in the wake of a
murder,2 32 it should no longer be presumed, as some courts have
opined in barring EIE, that jurors know of the emotional impact
an execution will have.33 In short, EIE represents a crucial
emotional counterweight.
234
This is not to say, as a fundamental matter, that VIE itself is
relevant or should be admitted. As Justice Stevens noted in his
Payne dissent, evidence pertaining to the emotional impact on
victims' families is "a classic non sequitur: The victim is not on trial;
her character, whether good or bad, cannot therefore constitute
either an aggravating or a mitigating circumstance. ,23 5 Rather, as
Mississippi Supreme Court Justice Michael Sullivan stated in his
recent dissent in Wicher v. State, where the majority approved the
admission of VIE at the same time it barred EIE, "[n]ow that victim
impact statements are admissible, any similar mitigating evidence
tion in an overly simplified manner"); Pillsbury, supra note 217, at 655 (arguing that emo-
tion, in the form of anger and sympathy, is a natural and indispensable component of
justice). But see Dubber, Tender Heart, supra note 17, at 111-12 (arguing that "[e]motional
responses should be excluded from capital sentencing not on account of their lack of foun-
dation in the evidence, but on account of their irrelevance to the sentencer's 'reasoned
moral response' independent of the evidence").
230. According to Susan Bandes, "the problem with victim impact statements is not that
they evoke emotion rather than reason. Rather, it is that they evoke unreasoned, unreflec-
tive emotion that cannot be placed in any usable perspective.... They overwhelm the jury
with feelings of outrage toward the defendant and identification with the victim." Bandes,
supra note 218, at 401.
231. See Howarth, supra note 12, at 1404 ("Pretending emotion is absent does not make
it so; acknowledging that emotion is already deeply at work.., can lead to seeing its value in
capital sentencing."); id. at 1403 ("[C]apital doctrine pretends to rest on reason, not emo-
tion, while in fact emotions are holding forth on all sides."); see also NORMAN J. FINKEL,
COMMONSENSE JUSTICE: JURORS' NOTIONS OF THE LAW 190 (1995) ("In the morality play
that is beginning, one that will be highly emotional, jurors may engage in a task of match-
ing, trying to decide if the defendant fits the prototype they have conceived. Then come the'
arguments and emotional pulls.").
232. See supra notes 82-91 and accompanying text.
233. See, e.g., People v. Sanders, 905 P.2d 420, 458-59 (Cal. 1996); Burns v. State, 699
So. 2d 646, 654 (Fla. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1121 (1998); State v. Loftin, 680 A.2d 677,
712 (N.J. 1996); State v. Stenson, 940 P.2d 1239, 1282 (Wash. 1997) (en banc).
234. This situation is exacerbated in those jurisdictions where defendants lack the right
to allocution and hence cannot directly ask jurors for "mercy." See, e.g., People v. Brown, 705
N.E.2d 809, 823 (Ill. 1998); State v. Guevara, 506 S.E.2d 711, 721 (N.C. 1998); see also Myers,
supra note 187, at 788 (discussing widespread reluctance of defendants to allocute, in large
part for fear that allocution testimony could be used in any subsequent retrial).
235. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 859 (1991) (Stevens,J., dissenting).
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should be deemed relevant on the basis of fairness and equal
parity.... [A]s the old proverb reads, what is good for the goose is
good for the gander .... ,, 6
2. Permitting the Creation of a Narrative Whole-A second reason
supporting admission of EIE stems from the reality that, when all is
said and done, a capital proceeding constitutes a story or narra-
tive, 23 a highly familiar interpretative model that jurors intuitively
use to make sense of the conflicting, graphic evidence put before
them.238 The critical role of narrative is highlighted in interviews
conducted with capital jurors as part of the Capital Jury Project, a
nationwide empirical study designed to assess juror decision mak-
ing and attitudes. As one juror explained:
[I began developing a story] as soon as they started presenting
the case. I used the evidence as it was being presented, as well
as later discussion during jury deliberations to create a story. I
had my own version of the story when the jury started deliber-
ating, but after discussion with the jury, the members, I was
able to kind of maybe adjust my conclusions of some certain
facts.
23 9
236. Wilcher v. State, 697 So. 2d 1087, 1117-18 (Miss. 1997) (Sullivan, J., dissenting).
Justice Sullivan added: "[Because the] criminal law requires more than an equal playing
field.... [T]here should be no doubt that a defendant's family may testify as to the impact
of the defendant's death just as the victim's family has done." Id. at 1117.
237. See Bandes, supra note 218, at 391 ("[Clapital punishment is thick with narrative
content."); Haney, supra note 206, at 605 ("It is the nexus between legal storytelling (in the
form of a defendant's social history) and the empathy that such storytelling is capable of
generating among jurors that offers the promise of individualized justice in the capital sen-
tencing process."). See generally Austin Sarat, Narrative Strategy and Death Penalty Advocacy, 31
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 353 (1996) (describing from the perspective of capital defense
counsel the critical role narrative plays in death penalty proceedings).
238. See FINKEL, supra note 231, at 70 ("[S]tories are relevant to the drama (jurors] are
witnessing, and to the moral decision they must make regarding the defendant's blamewor-
thiness."); Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, The Sto-y Model for Juror Decision Making, in
INSIDE THE JUROR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OFJUROR DECISION MAKING 192-221 (Reid Hastie ed.,
1993) (describing the "story model"); Benjamine Reid, The Tral Lauyer as Storyteller: Reviving
an Ancient Art, LITIG., Spring 1998, at 8, 8 ("Storytelling is as old as human communication.
People are accustomed to listening to stories."); Neil J. Vidmar & Regina A. Schuller, Juries
and Expert Evidence: Social Framework Testimony, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1989, at
133, 146 (characterizing storytelling model as "most widely accepted model" of juror deci-
sionmaking).
239. Scott E. Sundby, The Jury as Critic: An Empirical Look at How Capital Juries Perceive Ex-
pert and Lay Testimony, 83 VA. L. REv. 1109, 1177 n.138 (1997); see also Craig Haney,
Commonsense, Justice and Capital Punishment, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L., 303, 329 (1997)
(noting that polled jurors "embraced a narrative version of the defendant's life, put them-
selves in his shoes... and came to an empathetic understanding of his social history from a
largely subjective perspective").
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Quite understandably, in the penalty phase, the denouement of
the entire gruesome capital proceeding, jurors resort to narrative
to make sense of the "chaos.",2  Testimony by loved ones of the
emotional impact of a defendant's execution, and what it might say
about the quality and depth of relation between survivor and exe-
cuted, thus represents a critical piece of the narrative puzzle, just
as the toll imposed on the victims by the murder in the form of VIE
has now become. As one commentator recently observed, to en-
sure reliability of death decisions "the full story, including both the
reasons for separating an individual from society and the reasons
for the continued affiliation of the individual and society, must be
fully presented and argued before a jury."24 1 In this sense, EIE per-
mits the defendant's story to be fully told, allowing jurors a fuller
understanding of the human they are to adjudge.2 42
This narrative power is not lost on the current Supreme Court.
Writing for the Court in its 1997 decision in Old Chief v. United
States, Justice Souter stated that the component evidentiary parts of
a trial create a narrative, which "gains momentum, with power not
only to support conclusions but to sustain the willingness of jurors
to draw the inferences ... necessary to reach an honest verdict."
243
Evidence "can accomplish what no set of abstract statements ever
could, not just to prove a fact but to establish its human
significance, and so to implicate the law's moral underpinnings
and ajuror's obligation to sit in judgment."244
Furthermore, as Richard Sherwin has written, "legal storytelling
must also keep current with changing culture. The stories that
lawyers tell, and the frames within which they tell them, must
reflect the changing narrative conventions and meaningmaking
structures that resonate with one's audience. 2 45 Because the
246victim's "voice" now dominates sentencing, precluding EIE from
240. See Richard K. Sherwin, Law Frames: Historical Truth and Narrative Necessity in a
Criminal Case, 47 STAN. L. REv. 39, 71 (1994) (noting that "[c]haos is disorienting and un-
pleasant, especially in matters of life and death"); Meade, supra note 226, at 742-44
(discussing symbolic import of the death decision amid "chaos" of the murder).
241. Jeffrey J. Pokorak, Dead Man Talking: Competing Narratives and Effective Representation
in Capital Cases, 30 ST. MARY'S L.J. 421, 433 (1999).
242. See Howarth, supra note 12, at 1382-83 (asserting that the Supreme Court's recent
capital decisions have hastened a "disappearing defendant," and arguing that "[t]he best
way to draw the decisionmakers closer... is to tell them his story").
243. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 187 (1997).
244. Id. at 187-88; see also id. at 183, 187 (recognizing the "offering party's need for evi-
dentiary richness," which "tells a "colorful story with descriptive richness").
245. Sherwin, supra note 240, at 78.
246. This dominance has notable irony given the progressive orientation of the
progenitors of what has come to be known as "narrative scholarship." See, e.g., Kathryn
Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REv. 971 (1991); Richard Delgado, Storytelling
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the trial "narrative" acts as a special impediment in our emotion-
laden, crime-obsessed age-a time when the Oprah Winfrey Show
garners top ratings, and the O.J. Simpson murder trial transfixed
the nation for months. 247 On "Oprah," of course, the viewing public
(in effect the jury) "feels itself entitled to pass judgment. 'I feel,
therefore I may judge.' , 248 Placed in a jury box, and assigned the
249
awesome, likely one-time power to decide the capital question,
these same laypersons absorb the State's parade of negatives (and
relatively precious few positives) about the human they must judge.
When EIE is not permitted, however, they do not benefit from the
full range of emotional facets customarily brought to bear in
drawing inferences about others. As a result, they rightfully might
feel that something is missing, namely, the narrative counterweight
to VIE that at once educates jurors about the quality and breadth
of defendants' human ties and tellingly portrays their depth.
Once again, results from the Capital Jury Project underscore this
point. Polling capital jurors in California, Scott Sundby discovered
that testimony from family and friends stood out among the very
most influential forms of evidence received. Finding that lay wit-
,,250nesses have more persuasive value than "experts, a recognition
itself important to the discussion here, Sundby discovered that this
for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411 (1989); Toni M.
Massaro, Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and the Rule of Law: New Words, Old Wounds?, 87 MICH. L.
REv. 2099 (1989); Kim L. Scheppele, Foreword: Telling Stories, 87 MIcH. L. REv. 2073 (1989).
Perhaps recognizing that the conservative Rehnquist Court has taken such scholarship at
its word, Susan Bandes recently offered the caveat that "we must proceed carefully in mak-
ing claims about which stories belong in the legal arena .... Whether a particular narrative
should be heard in any given legal context will depend on particulars-the type of proceed-
ing, the type of narrative, and ultimately, the intended and actual effects of the narrative."
Bandes, supra note 218, at 383. Unfortunately, such concerns appear to have been voiced too
late. See Gewirtz, supra note 215, at 873-74 (arguing in favor of VIE and noting that "in the
most literal sense, victim impact evidence consists of stories of victimized and silenced peo-
ple, who are the usual concern of many in the storytelling movement").
247. As Robert Weisberg has written, "[t]he criminal trial is a 'miracle play' of govern-
ment in which we can carry out our inarticulate beliefs about crime and criminals within the
reassuring formal structure of disinterested due process." Robert Weisberg, Deregulating
Death, 1983 Sup. CT. REv. 305, 385. The phenomenon is a modern example of "performing
the laws," the use of popular trials to enunciate and deliberate matters of public concern. See
Robert Hariman, Performing the Laws: Popular Trials and Social Knowledge, in POPULAR TRIALS:
RHETORIC, MASS MEDIA, AND THE LAw (Robert Hariman ed. 1990).
248. See Gewirtz, supra note 215, at 886-87.
249. See Leigh B. Bienen, Helping Jurors Out: Post-Verdict Debriefing for Jurors in Emotionally
Disturbing Trials, 68 IND. L.J. 1333 passim (1993) (describing common psychological and
emotional trauma experienced by jurors in homicide trials); Joseph L. Hoffman, Where's the
Buck? Juror Misperception of Sentencing Responsibility in Death Penalty Cases, 70 IND. L.J. 1137,
1155 (1995) (describing traumatic, long-term psychological effects of capital trials on ju-
rors).
250. See Sundby, supra note 239, at 1115.
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effectiveness "reveals both an emotional and a factual component,"
effects not diminished by the predictably positive nature of the tes-
timony.2 51 "At the most basic level, from an emotional viewpoint,
the testimony shows that someone cares about the defendant and
believes that he has some redeeming value."252 Sundby reports that
to a significant extent the emotional impact stems from jurors'
ability to "relate to the parent or the sibling in a way that they sim-
ply cannot to the defendant who has committed this horrible
crime. 2 5 This connection, in turn, "brings other individuals into
the picture who will be affected by the decision of whether to exe-
cute the defendant."254 Sundby discusses several jurors for whom
such factors were dispositive in their decision to vote for life 255
Of equal if not greater importance, Sundby found the absence of
such testimony was unfavorably noted by jurors. This void was
expressed in a post-verdict interview of one capital juror who, when
asked if any defense witnesses "backfired," stated: "I'd say the
mother's testimony ... . She said stuff like he was a good boy.
People, I guess, were expecting her like to plead for his life ....
She didn't really get into doing any of that .... 2s 6 Such sentiments
tellingly illustrate the primary ill-effect of precluding EIE: it denies
narrative "coverage," which jury researchers Nancy Pennington
and Reid Hastie view as critical in jurors' decisions of which
narrative is to "be viewed as more acceptable."57 Coverage, they
write, "refers to the extent to which the story accounts for evidence
presented .... [T]he greater the story's coverage, the more
acceptable is the story ....,,258 In Old Chief v. United States the
Supreme Court recognized the "fact that juries have expectations
251. Seeid.at1152.
252. Id.; see also id. at 1153 ("[L] istening to a parent or sibling talk about the defendant-
how he added to their lives, how they feel responsible for the way he turned out, how they
will feel.., if he is sentenced to death-almost always has an emotional impact on the jury.").
253. Id. at 1154.
254. Id.
255. See id at 1154-55. Notably, Sundby acknowledges that "many" of the jurors inter-
viewed participated in death cases before Payne was handed down. Commenting on one
juror in particular, who ultimately voted for death, and who characterized as "dramatic" a
"battle between the ... mothers," Sundby states that "[tlhe juror's statements suggest that
the emotional impact of the testimony of the defendant's family in mitigation may be damp-
ened through the prosecution's use of victim impact statements." Id. at 1155 n.102.
256. Id. at 1161.
257. See Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Explaining the Evidence: Tests of the Story Model
forJuror Decision Making, 63J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 189, 190 (1992).
258. Pennington & Hastie, supra note 257, at 190; see also Nancy Pennington & Reid
Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decisionmaking: The Story Model, 13 CARDOzO L. REv. 519,
528 (1991) ("A story is plausible to the extent that it corresponds to the decisionmaker's
knowledge about what typically happens in the world and does not contradict that knowl-
edge.").
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as to what evidence ought to be presented by a party, and may well
hold the absence of that evidence against the party .... 25 9 As
noted by Justice Souter, "a naked proposition in a courtroom may
be no match for the robust evidence that would be used to prove
it, "2w a recognition at plain odds with the view that EIE is somehow
"cumulative" of testimony from defense witnesses of their fondness
for the defendant.
2 6
'
In short, a criminal trial is "a struggle about what stories may be
told at trial, how stories must be told,", 62 in which the trial judge
serves as the "editor of the narrative." 26 3 Judicial editing (indeed,
exclusion) of EIE, while permitting the emotionally potent, per-
sonalizing influence of VIE, imposes an intolerable limit on the
capacity of capital defendants to provide a counter narrative-to
tell the sentencer their "whole story." "In the end," as Craig Haney
has written,
[i] t is the defendant as a complete person ... who will suffer
the ultimate penalty. The fundamental purpose of the capital
sentencing hearing is to force the sentencer to view the de-
fendant as a person, no matter how hard some prosecutors
might try to describe the defendant as an animal or an inani-
mate object.2H1
It is no longer enough that descriptive testimony from family
and friends of defendants' positive traits can get before the jury.
EIE must be admitted to fill the demonstrable narrative void that
259. Old Chiefv. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 188 n.9n (1997); see also id. at 188 (noting
that "beyond the power of conventional evidence to support allegations and give life to the
moral underpinnings of law's claims, there lies the need for evidence in all its particularity
to satisfy the jurors' expectations about what proper proof should be").
260. Id. at 189. Although Old Chief addressed the issue of perceived evidentiary com-
pleteness at the guilt stage, in that case relating to the nature of a stipulation for a prior
conviction, the same-if not greater-argument obtains in the capital sentencing realm,
with its relaxed evidentiary standards and heightened need for the jury to have a full under-
standing of the "deathworthiness" of the convicted murderer they must evaluate.
261. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
262. Gewirtz, supra note 215, at 863.
263. See Alan M. Dershowitz, Life Is Not a Dramatic Narrative, in LAw's STORIES: NARRA-
TIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAw 99, 103 (1996).
264. Haney, supra note 206, at 608; see also Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 387 (1990)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) ("The insistence in our law that the sentencer know and consider
the defendant as a human being before deciding to impose the ultimate sanction operates
as a shield against arbitrary execution .... ").
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otherwise exists for capital jurors when such emotionally powerful
information is barred 65
3. Permitting Jurors to Obtain an Informed Understanding of Harm-
Finally, EIE should be admitted because juror consideration of it is
consistent with the tenets of modern sentencing philosophy, and
the basic rationales of Payne itself.
As for the former, American courts routinely find highly rele-
vant, and often dispositive, any prospective "impact" on third
parties when meting out punishments for non-capital crimes. 66
Traditionally, this has been especially so with respect to white-
261collar offenses. Indeed, in finding that "harm" should play a role
in assessing the appropriateness of capital punishment, the Payne
Court relied on a well-known book relating to the sentencing of
white-collar criminals.2 That EIE should be barred from capital
trials when identical information is considered in non-capital sen-
tencing decisions, where the stakes are so much lower, and far
stricter evidentiary limits are usually tolerated,269 represents an
ironic inconsistency that demands remedy.
Second, EIE should be allowed because its admission is
consistent with Payne's conception of the "harm" jurors must assess
when meting out punishment.2 70  The Payne majority itself
characterized "the assessment of harm caused by the defendant" as
an "important concern of the criminal law," albeit of "recent
origin. 27' According to the Payne court, "[a] State may legitimately
conclude that evidence about the victim and about the impact of
265. See, e.g., Sundby, supra note 239, at 1178 (asserting that "[iln developing the story
that they will use in arriving at a verdict, jurors rely heavily upon their own life experi-
ences").
266. See, e.g., People v. Meyer, 680 N.E.2d 315, 317 (Ill. 1997) (imposition of probation-
ary term in lieu of incarceration in part because of adverse collateral effects on defendant's
family that would come with imprisonment); Edgecomb v. State, 673 N.E.2d 1185, 1199
(Ind. 1996) (giving mitigating weight to fact that "imprisonment would result in undue
hardship on [defendant's] children," construing IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-1-7.1(c) (10) (West
1997)); State v. Mirakaj, 632 A.2d 850, 851 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 1993) (reversing non-
capital sentence because lower court failed to consider impact on defendant's children).
267. See STANTON WHEELER ET AL., SITrING IN JUDGMENT: THE SENTENCING OF WHITE-
COLLAR CRIMINALS 152-56 (1988) (discussing widespread judicial consideration of adverse
impact on families and others when sentencing white-collar criminals). But see U.S. SENTENC-
ING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.6 (1999) (stating "[flamily ties and responsibilities ... are
not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a sentence should be outside the applicable
guideline range").
268. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 820 (citing WHEELER ET AL., supra note 267).
269. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
270. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 824-25.
271. Id. at 819, 821.
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the murder on the victim's family is relevant to the jury's decision
as to whether or not the death penalty should be imposed."
272
This conception of harm highlights another of the manifold
qualities of EIE: it powerfully conveys to the jurors that their death
verdict will affect other members of their community. EE permits
jurors to recognize in a visceral way that their capital decision does
not occur in a vacuum-that the life they may decide to take
perhaps has had, and perhaps will continue to have, some positive
effect on others. jurors must be permitted to assess the aggregate
harm that will ensue with their decision to impose death;274 the
murder victim is not the only casualty of the capital punishment
process.2 75  Post-trial polling responses from capital jurors,
272. Id. at 827. It bears mention that the Court's assessment of VIE as being of "recent
origin" is itself subject to question. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Harm and Punishment: A Cri-
tique of Emphasis on the Results of Conduct in the Criminal Law, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1497, 1602
(1974) (suggesting that focus on harm in adjudging moral blameworthiness is "largely a
holdover from the days of retaliatoryjustice").
273. See State v. Mann, 934 P.2d 784, 795 (Ariz. 1997) (en banc) (noting mitigating evi-
dence of defendant's "relationship with his children and the effect on them if he were
executed"); Lawrie v. State, 643 A.2d 1336, 1339 (Del. 1994) (noting that defendant's
"execution would have 'a substantially adverse impact' on his seven-year-old son ... and on
[defendant's] mother"); State v. Manley, Nos. 95-11007022, 95-11006992, 1997 WL 27094, at
*13, (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 10, 1997) (noting that the "death sentence would have a devastat-
ing impact upon [defendant's] family"); State v. Watson, C.R.A. Nos. IN91-09-0020 to C.R.A.
IN91-09-0025, 1993 WL 603341, at *5, (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 19, 1993) (noting that "the de-
fendant is a member of the victim's family and his execution would further traumatize that
family"); Barnes v. State, 496 S.E.2d 674, 687-89 (Ga. 1998) (reversing death sentence be-
cause inter alia trial court refused to admit photos of defendant's daughter and nephew
intended to "show the jury that a death sentence would impact the children in his life");
State v. Benn, 845 P.2d 289, 316 (Wash. 1993) (en banc) (noting "the affection of family
members, and the loss to his loved ones if he were sentenced to death").
274. To date, little research has been conducted on the adverse effects of execution on
the lives of the families of persons condemned to death. As Margaret Vandiver recently
noted, "[i]f there is one unchanging aspect of capital punishment, it must be the pain that
homicides and executions cause the families involved." Margaret Vandiver, The Impact of the
Death Penalty on the Families of Homicide Victims and of Condemned Prisoners, in AMERICA'S Ex-
PERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 477, 477 (James R. Acker et al. eds., 1998). Vandiver
adds that "[w]hatever effect executions may have on victims' families, it is certain that they
are devastating for the families of defendants." Id. at 486. Further, "[it seems reasonable to
assume that a parent's death sentence and eventual execution would have even more trau-
matic effects on children." Id. at 488 n.11.
275. Needless to say, this argument would find favor among those advocates of the view
that capital punishment is nothing more than state-sanctioned murder. See, e.g., Albert
Camus, Reflexions sur la Guillotine, in REFLEXIONS SUR LA PEINE CAPITALE 123, 126 (Arthur
Koestler & Albert Camus eds., 1957); ROBERT JOHNSON, DEATH WORK: A STUDY OF THE
MODERN EXECUTION PROCESS 218-24 (2d ed. 1998).
In ultimate terms, the conflicting demands of a capital trial-on the one side conven-
tional aggravating evidence and VIE, and the other mitigating evidence designed to
convince jurors that the offender should be spared--can be viewed as competing demands
for victimhood. This in itself has significance insofar as "victim" status today enjoys tran-
scendant appeal among most Americans. See JOSEPH A. AMATO, VICTIMS AND VALUES: A
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interviewed as part of the Capital Jury Project, highlight the role
such information can play. For instance, one California capital
juror who had been a hold-out in favor of death, but ultimately
decided in favor of life, stated: "'I think that ... the most
mitigating thing that would lead us away from the death penalty
[was] just how it was devastating to [the defendant's family]. That
basically, having him put to death is just going to create more
victims ... ,,276
In recognizing this significance it is important to observe that
such evidence is related to, but fundamentally differs from, the
realm of grisly evidence relating to the physical impact on the de-
fendant of the execution itself, which courts as a rule prohibit.
2 77
Although one certainly can argue (as others have) 278 that such grim
information should be provided jurors in the name of fairness to
counterbalance the predictably heinous presentations of the crime
and offender offered by the State, this is not the argument made
here. Rather, the purpose of EIE is to provide jurors with informa-
tion critical to their "reasoned moral response." As Craig Haney
has written, "[p]eople are more likely to act on the impulse to pun-
ish when the consequences or personal costs of such actions are
made to seem small, insignificant or distant. Thus, people can act
HISTORY AND THEORY OF SUFFERING, at xix (1990) (noting that "claims of suffering have
invaded and, in measure, overwhelmed contemporary conscience and political rhetoric");
ROBERT ELIAS, THE POLITICS OF VICTIMIZATION: VICTIMS, VICTIMOLOGY AND HUMAN
RIGHTS passim (1986) (canvassing manifold ways in which victimhood has come to enjoy
social and political prominence). But with the appeal of victimhood have come conflicting
demands, resulting in a competition between and among members of society: "The claims of
suffering confuse and divide us." See Amato, supra, at xvii; see also id. at 177 ("While there is
no doubt... that we presume victims to be those who wrongly suffer harm and injury, the
question still remains of whether they can be classified into hierarchies of serious suffering
and deserved attention.").
276. Sundby, supra note 239, at 1155; see also Pam Belluck, In Nebraska, Amendment for
Equal Rights Keeps Condemned Killer Alive, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1999, at A9 (quoting husband
of one of two murder victims as believing that " ' three lives had been lost that night,' the
lives of the two women and [the defendant]").
277. Courts typically justify exclusion on the basis that such information is irrelevant to
mitigation insofar as the evidence does not relate to the defendant's character or record or
the circumstances of the crime. See, e.g., McGahee v. State, 632 So. 2d 976, 978 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1993); People v. Fudge, 875 P.2d 36, 60 (Cal. 1994); Wilcher v. State, 697 So. 2d 1087,
1104 (Miss. 1997).
278. See, e.g., KENT S. MILLER & MICHAEL L. RADELET, EXECUTING THE MENTALLY ILL:
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND THE CASE OF ALVIN FORD 46 (1993); Howarth, supra
note 12, at 1390-92; Earl Martin, Towards an Evolving Debate on the Decency of Capital Punish-
ment, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 84, 121-22 (1997).
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punitively if they feel that they, or others they care about, have
nothing to lose by the punitive actions they take."279
Precisely because jurors are kept in the dark relative to the grisly
physical realities of the death penalty, they should be privy to
knowledge of the basic human consequences of their decisions.
Access to such information should go a long way toward lessening
the widespread, well-documented tendency among capital jurors to
either misperceive or discount their responsibility in death deci-
• 280an ote dl e
sions, and otherwise delude themselves into thinking that their
affirmative death decision are of little moral moment because they
will not likely be carried out.
28 1
279. Haney, supra note 225, at 1474. Professors Jordan and Carol Steiker have offered a
similar argument with respect to defendant character evidence more generally. Such evi-
dence allows jurors
to appreciate the humanity of the defendant and to recognize thereby the gravity of
the decision to impose the death penalty in a particular case. Confronted with details
about an individual defendant a sentencer may be moved-in an inarticulable and
nonstandardized way-to impose a sentence less than death.
Steiker & Steiker, Let God Sort Them Out? supra note 36, at 845 n.50; see also Howarth, supra
note 12, at 1382 (noting that imposing death "becomes more difficult when it is connected
to a real person").
Once again, the unavailability of the common law right to allocute in many jurisdictions,
or the widespread reluctance of capital defendants to speak directly to the jury when such a
tight exists, further exacerbates this problem of "dehumanization." See sources cited supra
note 234. As a result, defendants risk being sentenced to death "by ajury which never heard
the sound of [their] voice." McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 220 (1971).
280. See, e.g., William J. Bowers, The CapitalJury: Is It Tilted Toward Death ?, 79JUDICATURE
220, 223 (1996); Theodore Eisenberg et al., Jury Responsibility in Capital Sentencing, 44 BuFF.
L. RaV. 339, 353 tbl.1 (1996); Hoffman, supra note 249, at 1138; see also Albert Bandura,
Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement, in ORIGINS OF TERRORISM: PSYCHOLOGIES, IDEOLOGIES,
THEOLOGIES, STATES OF MIND 161, 173 (Walter Reich ed., 1990) (noting that "[p]eople
behave in injurious ways they normally repudiate if a legitimate authority accepts responsi-
bility for the consequences of their conduct"); Paul Whitlock Cobb, Jr., Reviving Mercy in the
Structure of Capital Punishment, 99 YALE L.J. 389, 395 (1989) (stating that providing a "judicial
imprimatur serves to absolve other governmental actors from responsibility for independ-
ently evaluating death decisions").
Stephen Garvey surmises that victim impact evidence itself has the potential for promot-
ing, indeed exacerbating, juror abdication of sentencing responsibility. Describing his
results from interviews conducted with South Carolina jurors serving on capital trials before
Payne, Garvey states that as a result of being exposed to impact evidence "jurors may come to
think of themselves almost as the victim's agent, thus potentially eroding any prevailing
norms of jury independence or individual juror responsibility." Stephen P. Garvey, supra
note 127, at 1554.
281. See Haney, supra note 225, at 1447 (summarizing research to this effect); Howarth,
supra note 12, at 1416-17 (same).
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CONCLUSION
In its most benign sense, Payne v. Tennessee can be said to rest on
the Supreme Court's guiding principle that capital jurors should
be privy to the maximum amount of information possible when
making the "individualized" decision of which defendants merit
death. s2 Payne, however, represents a perverse subversion of this
noble doctrine, geared as it is toward "individualizing" the victim,
as opposed to the defendant, when the jury is asked only to make a
decision about the latter's fate. As a consequence of Payne, capital
jurors throughout the country now regularly hear lengthy, highly
prejudicial accounts of the unvarnished positive personal charac-
teristics of decedents and the incalculably broad "impact" their
deaths have had. ss Worse yet, precious little, if any, guidance is
given to jurors in how to weigh and employ such emotionally ex-
plosive testimony in their capital decisions.84 Taken together, Payne
has opened the emotional floodgates in favor of the State, at the
same time Parks and Brown have squelched any vestigal impulse to
find "sympathy" for capital defendants.
To a significant extent, the current majority rule permitting the
State to monopolize "impact evidence" inspires comparison to the
early common law, a time when felony defendants (who by defini-
tion faced the death penalty) stood mute before the jury unable to
call witnesses and were themselves not permitted to testify under
oath. s5 Although perhaps extreme, such a view is not far off the
282. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 603 (1978) (citation omitted) ("'[P]ossesion of
the fullest information possible concerning the defendant's life and characteristics' [is]
'[h]ighly relevant-if not essential--[to the] selection of an appropriate sentence ....'");
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 204 (1976) (the capital jury should "have as much informa-
tion before it as possible when it makes the sentencing decision"); see also United States v.
Pitera, 795 F. Supp. 546, 551-53 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (asserting that Payne facilitates the indi-
vidualization of capital decisions); Haney, supra note 225, at 1476 (admitting victim impact
evidence "is arguably justified in the interest of maximizing the amount of information
available to juror called on to make a death-sentencing decision").
283. See supra notes 93-127 and accompanying text (discussing widespread use of highly
prejudicial VIE and lack of controls); see also Gewirtz, supra note 215, at 882 ("[F]or survivors
to be asked to tell about the victim's particular characteristics in this context invites a pre-
dictable selectively in detail. Typically ... people have complex and conflicting feelings
about family members. But how frequently does victim impact evidence after a family mem-
ber's murder dwell on these complexities?").
284. See supra notes 93-127 and accompanying text.
285. See George Fisher, The Jury's Rise as Lie Detector, 107 YALE LJ. 575, 597-604 (1997).
Fisher notes that it was not until 1702 that felony defendants could call sworn witnesses, and
not until 1864 in America, and 1898 in England, that they themselves were permitted to
testify under oath in their defense. See id. at 597, 662; cf Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496,
520 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (asserting that decision to bar victim impact evidence "is
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mark given the onslaught of VIE in capital trials. To those con-
cerned that reciprocal admission of the EIE and VIE risks the
distracting specter of "mini-trials,"286 one must ask: "distracted from
what?" 287 Capital trials have become little more than a "rematch"
between the defendant and his victim. The Constitution-and
fundamental fairness-demand that EIE be permitted to ensure
procedural fairness between capital defendants and the State, and
to provide capital juries access to the fundamentally important in-
formation it conveys.
in effect to prescribe a debate on the appropriateness of the death penalty with one side
muted.").
For a comprehensive treatment of the gradual erosion of this practice, culminating in the
adoption of the Compulsory Process Clause in the Sixth Amendment, and the goal of evi-
dentiary even-handedness animating origin the Clause, see Richard A. Nagareda,
Reconceiving the Right to Present Witnesses, 97 MICH. L. REv. 1063 (1999).
286. Such an outcome, with respect to victim-related information alone, was ominously
predicted by the majority in Booth. See Booth, 482 U.S. at 507.
287. This same observation has been made by Professor Paul Gewirtz, but in support of
his argument in favor of admitting VIE. See Gewirtz, supra note 215, at 876 n.35 ("Telling a
story often prompts others to tell a story.... But the argument about distraction really begs
the question here, which is whether victim evidence is indeed a distraction from relevant
matters or is itself one of the relevant matters.").
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